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Resumo 
A compensação dos CEOs é um tema de interesse global. Os escândalos 
empresariais, para além de terem trazido um interesse acrescido a este tema, 
trouxeram também uma série de requerimentos com os quais as empresas devem 
cooperar, e divulgações que as empresas devem fazer.  
Esta tese tem como objectivo verificar quais são as variáveis que definem, e 
determinam, o nível de compensação dos CEOs das empresas portuguesas 
cotadas para o período entre 2011 e 2017. Realizámos duas anaálises 
complementares, uma análise cross-section, e uma análise em painel. As variáveis 
testadas como determinantes incluem performance, dimensão, anos como CEO, 
propriedade, conselho de administração, consultores da comissão de 
remunerações, dualidade e TSR. 
Os resultados deste estudo revelaram que a compensação dos CEOs é 
determinada pela performance e pelos anos em que desempenham a função de 
CEO na empresa. Também foi detetada a existência de impacto, da dimensão e 
do número de consultores da comissão de remuneração, na determinação do 
nível de compensação. 
 
Palavras-chave: Compensação do CEO; Determinants, Portugal; Euronext 
Lisboa; PSI 20 
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Abstract 
CEO compensation is a topic of interest throughout the world. Corporate 
scandals brought an increased interest in the topic, but also compliance 
requirements that companies must disclose, such as CEO compensation.  
This thesis aims to assess what defines and determines the level of CEO 
compensation in Portuguese listed companies, for the period between 2011 and 
2017. We have performed two complementary analysis, a cross section analysis 
and a panel analysis. The determinants tested included company performance 
and size, tenure, ownership, Board of Directors, compensation consultants, 
duality and TSR. 
Our results show that CEO compensation is determined by company 
performance, as well as by CEO tenure. It was also found an impact of company 
size, and number of compensation consultants, on CEO compensation.  
 
Keywords: CEO Compensation, Determinants, Portugal, Euronext Lisbon, PSI 
20 
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Introduction 
Nowadays society is overwhelmed with Chief Executive Officer1 related news 
that media releases. Titles reffering how much CEOs have earned, who are the 
ones that received higher compensation levels, how much he earns more than the 
average of his co-workers, how the compensation is or is not affected by company 
performance, how compensation evolves through time, and lastly how 
compensation have reacted to crisis.  
The impact of crisis on CEO compensation is a very close topic to the 
Portuguese since it represented a tough period to families and companies. It is 
then expected that headlines addressing how CEO compensation was not 
affected by contraction period, even contributing to compensation rises, cause at 
least some curioseness amongst our society. Real (2018) found that compensation 
was actually not affected by the crisis period.  
Executive compensation, and specially CEO, is also a wide spread topic when 
it comes to scientific literature. Being understood as an agency problem, it derives 
from agency theory (Gomez-Mejia, Hinkin, & Tosi (1987) and Nyberg, Fulmer, 
Gerhart, and Carpenter (2010)). This means that the principal and the agent, 
shareholders and manager respectively inccur in a moral hazard problem. To 
solve this problem is crucial to have both, the shareholders and CEO, interests 
aligned. As the principle is not sure what will be the agent performance, the way 
to ensure his interests, maximizing shareholders value, is through compensation. 
                                                 
1 From here forward CEO 
  
Literature (Bebchuk & Fried (2003)) states that well structure compensation 
packages are the key to solve such problems. Empirical research have widely 
focused in what are the components of compensation, what are the best ways to 
compensate s as to align interests and what and how is determined the optimal 
level of compensation (Chalmers, Koh, & Stapledon, 2006).  
The purpose of this study is to address what, and how, it determines CEO 
compensation. The aim is to understand, amongst company and environment 
features, as well as individual characteristics and also time frame, what does have 
an impact when it comes to the compensation settlement process.  
It is of our knowledge that there are studies addressing the relationship 
between variables such as performance (Brick, Palmon, and Wald (2006) and 
Firth, Fung, and Rui (2006)) or company size (Baker and Hall (2004) and (Wright, 
Kroll, and Elenkov (2002)) and compensation. Most of these studies also include 
some other variables that can influence compensation, but mostly as control 
variables. Some studies attempt to explain how performance affectes 
compensation, and others try the reverse, how compensation influences 
performance. 
However, it is of our understanding that this thesis provide a new insight in 
this topic. Aiming to understand what defines the level of compensation that 
CEOs earn, we have compiled several compensation determinants that are 
endogenous and exogenous to the CEO, and the company. The other insight 
provided by this thesis is the application to Portuguese listed companies, as a 
way to understand how compensation is determined or settled in the Portuguese 
case. 
In addition to the fact that in this studie we are using the latest annual financial 
information, for the year of 2017, we are also addressing the years of 2014 and 
2011. The reason behind the last year of the sample hides another purpose of this 
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study. 2011 was the year in which compensation disclosure became an obligation 
to listed companies. Furthermore, 2011 was the year in which the Corporate 
Governance report requirements enabled the needed information for this study. 
For this reason, it is our intention also, to assess how compensation reacted to the 
test of time after the disclosure obligation.  
The determinants analysed throughout this study will be performance and 
size, as well as, ownership, top management structure, human capital variables, 
duality, compensation consultants, economic sector, total shareholders return. 
This study will be organized as it follows: the first chapter presents the 
literature review, followed by chapter 2 that explains the regulatory framework 
of disclosure obligation.Chapter 3 develops the hypotheses taken in this thesis 
and chapter 4 describes the data and methodology used in the study. Chapter 5 
presents the results of the model and lastly, the final chapter presents the 
conclusions and future research suggestions. 
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Chapter 1: Literature Review 
1.1. Corporate Governance and Agency Theory 
“Corporate governance refers to the systems by which companies are directed 
and controlled, including the institutional arrangements for boardroom pay 
setting.”(Conyon, Gregg, & Machin, 1995, p. 710). In this context CEO issues are 
within corporate governance domain.  
As corporate governance includes all the controlling systems, including 
management, Board of Directors, Fiscal Council, Remuneration Committee, 
amongst other statutory bodies take part in this play. As mentioned above, pay 
setting is one of the tasks that corporate governance has to address. This is where 
CEO compensation enters.2  
The process of setting CEO compensation starts with early market research as 
to what CEO the company should hire. This is where agency theory takes place 
(Grossman and Hart (1983) and Holmstrom (1979)):  
“ (…) contract under which one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage 
another person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf which 
involves delegating some deciosion making authority to the agent. If both 
parties to the relationship are utility maximizers, there is good reason to 
believe that the agent will not always act in the best interests of the 
principal. The principal can limit divergences from his interest by 
                                                 
2 For sure that every statutory body have compensation and for every one of them pay setting is a matter of 
corporate governance. This thesis will only address CEO compensation.  
  
establishing appropriate incentives for the agent and by incurring 
monitoring costs desingned to limit the abberant activities of the agent.” 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976, p. 398). 
It might be logical to state that the relationship between Board of Directors and 
CEO fits within the agency theory, and so it suffers from agency problems. The 
problems will upsurge for reasons such as asymmetric information 3  that 
management have that can be crucial to compensation settlement and that 
managers monopolize, as to play in their own advantage (Murphy, 1985).  
Agency problems might also arise from weak governance structures, which 
will present aggravated agency problems. Despite that, CEOs will receive higher 
compensation, even though those companies tend to have poorer levels of 
performance (Core, Holthausen, & Larcker, 1999). This might be explained 
through CEO empowerment. Over empowered management can also be suitable 
in the agency problem framework. In situations that ownership and management 
are different entities, management can use power and discretion in order to chase 
down self-interets, such as the expansion of pay packages (Grabke-Rundell & 
Gomez-Mejia, 2002).4 
These problems might be mitigated through alignement of incentives, 
ensuring that CEO will act in the best interest of the shareholders maximizing 
their utility. With differed interests, the latter ones will have to come up with 
solutions that guarantee great results and higher returns. These practices 
tendentially lie within compensation and comprehend the indexation of 
remuneration to performance indicators. Jensen and Murphy (1990) propose that 
CEOs have to encouraged to maximise company value through salary, bonuses, 
stake in the company and stock options structured to provide great rewards in 
cases of superior performance, as well as penalties for cases of poor performance. 
                                                 
3 Asymmetric information, as it is in CEO possession, and shareholders are not aware of it. 
4 Which would be easier to happen in weaker structure cases.  
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Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that sepration of ownership and control is 
intimately connected with agency problems. These problems come up because of 
the differenciated interests between shareholders and managers, meaning 
conflicts of interest. The first ones want to maximize their equity value, the latter 
ones want to have higher compensation with the least effort possible, “To re-
align these interests, organizations aim to employ optimal pay for performance 
mechanisms.” (Detzen & Zülch, 2012, p. 106).5  
Not only pay for performance is necessary in companies, as interests 
alignement mechanism between ownership and management, but pay is also a 
great deal once it allows companies to retain expert CEOs. As the CEO is the 
ultimate responsible for investment and financing decisions, operations and 
company performance, as Core and Guay (2010) stated, CEO expertise is crucial 
to companies. 
Executive compensation have always been an atracttive topic for both media 
and academics. Having the background of agency theory, severeal studies have 
considered the relationship between firm performance and executive 
compensation, only to find insignificant or minor positive results (Jensen and 
Murphy (1990)). Newer tests or applications of agency theory allowed 
interdisciplinary researches to disclose relationships between compensation and 
governance factors, capital structure, regulation, industrial structure and 
investment decisions (Murphy (1999)). “However, the variation in CEO 
compensation still cannot be adequately explained by agency theory.” (Young & 
Tsai, 2008, p. 364). 
There are two other theorys that can help explaining executive compensation: 
human capital theory and managerialism. Both of them support agency theory 
by introducing manager specific features6. The first theory states that greater 
                                                 
5 See also Bebchuk & Fried (2003). 
6 Such as skill power or age.  
  
managerial skills and expertise act as the source of competitive advantage that 
companies want to achieve (Harris and Helfat (1997)). The second one states that 
compensation is tied up with company features such as performance or size 
(Gomez-Mejia et al. (2000)). 
Dow and Raposo (2005) refered that even thought the process of engaging 
with a CEO and setting his remuneration takes part in the agency model, it differs 
since compensation can be adjusted over time in order to reflect company 
performance. 7  This does not mean that the CEO have no influence in 
compensation settlement. Business decisions that lay within CEO responsibility, 
such as mergers, acquisitions and restructuring can lead to higher levels of pay. 
Nevertheless, it can be concluded that, not only the relationship between board 
structure and management, but also, between stakeholders and management fit 
into the agency theory panorama described above.  
 
1.2. Rent Extraction or Labour Demand  
Labour demand and rent extraction theory attempt to justify the level of 
compensation that CEOs are offered. Labour demand theory states that the 
optimal level of CEO compensation is tied to the company labour demand and 
the alignement of interests between CEO and shareholders. Rent extraction 
theory however, states that CEO compensation tends to be excessive, reflecting 
the CEO capability of extracting benefits (Chalmers et al., 2006).  
It is important to keep in mind that rent extraction theory defends the Board 
inoperativeness given its passivity, reliability on the CEO to obtain information 
and lack of exposure to share returns. This enables CEO to extract rents8, and 
                                                 
7 Retification is typically done through the variable component of compensation, mainly through options and 
incentive plans. 
8 Higher compensation when comparing to the optimal level 
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ultimately means that weak, or less effective, governance structures have larger 
agency problems (Bebchuk, Fried & Walker, 2002). Eventually these problems 
can have a negative impact in company value.  
Frydman and Jenter (2010), recurring to S&P 500, show that managerial power 
and competitive market forces are important determinants of CEO pay. The same 
is argued by Bugeja, Matolcsy and Spiropoulos (2017), however, the authors 
found inconsistent managerial power evidence, as compensation of the newly 
and outgoing CEOs did not differ. Nonetheless, neither theories are sufficient to 
explain available evidence. That is the reason why there is no consensus if rent 
extraction or optimal contracting is relatively important to determine the pay of 
the CEO. 
 
1.3. CEO Compensation components  
Over time, the level and the composition of CEO pay have changed radically. 
Before the 1970s the pay levels were lower, combined with little dispersion across 
top managers and moderate levels of equity compensation. Since de mid-1970s 
to the end of 1990s compensation components grew drastically and differences 
in pay across executives and firms were amplified (Frydman & Jenter, 2010). 
Nowadays, a variety of news claim that CEOs are earning more eery year, as well 
as many times more as the average company worker.  
As mentioned in agency theory section, compensation is a crucial tool to align 
CEO and shareholders interests in order to maximize company value. This means 
that a well designed compensation package can be a great instrument to eradicate 
conflicts of interest. Compensation comes tendentially in a package, composed 
by several parts. Sigler (2011) argues that compensation includes base fixed 
wage, incentive plans and other benefits. These other benefits can be such as life 
and health insurance, retirement plans, car allowances, health-club 
  
memberships, travel reimbursements, paid holidays and golden parachutes 9 . 
This compensation packages rely on a fixed and a variable component. Comonly, 
the fixed part consists in cash and, the variable component tends to be linked to 
performance indicators. 
Figure 1 presents a summary of the compensation package components. The 
following sections take a further explanation about several compensation 
components.  
 
 
 
Figure 1: Components of CEO Compensation Package (based on Sigler (2011) and Frydman and 
Jenter (2010) 
  
                                                 
9 Benefit given to top management if the company is acquired making them lose their job. It can consist in bonuses, 
severance apy and stock options.  
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1.3.1 Main componentes of CEO Compensation Package 
Frydman and Jenter (2010) identified five basic components that integrate 
most CEO compensation packages. These are: salary, annual bonus, payouts 
from long-term incentive plans, restricted option grants and restricted stock 
grants. In the early times of their analysis (1936-1950’s) the composition of the 
CEO compensation was mostly salaries and annual bonuses. Bonus were, and 
are, mainly non-discretionary, tied to measures of annual performance, paid in 
cash or stock. For this reason, the 1960s saw an increase in the impact of long-
term incentive plans. These plans often rely on bonus based in multi-year 
performance. In the early 1980’s the authors verify the surge of stock option 
compensation. This kind of compensation tie remuneration to performance, 
encouraging management to maximize shareholder value, and ultimately 
aligning interests (Frydman & Jenter, 2010) and therefore aligns the shareholders’ 
interests to the CEOs interests. 
The authors argue that stock option became, in the 1990’s, the largest 
component of the CEO compensation, probably driven by tax policies that 
enabled much lower rate for capital gains rather than labor income tax. Also with 
equity compensation becoming widespread, compensation came to be composed 
by risk instruments such as shares and options, exposing CEOs to risk.  
 Even though “a significant portion of overall rise in CEO pay is driven by the 
increase in option compensation “(…) the growth in stock option use did not 
occur at the expense of other components of pay” (Frydman & Jenter, 2010, p. 6). 
This means that despite the visible increase in the use of stock options, other 
components did not saw their part diminished, leading to an overall raise in CEO 
compensation. 
  
  
1.3.2 Other Components of CEO Compensation Package 
Frydman and Jenter (2010) outline three additional components of 
compensation: perquisites, pensions, and severance pay. These elements face 
insufficient disclosure conducting leading to the so-called “stealth” 
compensation once it may allow executives to incur in rent extraction. However, 
these forms of pay can also arise in optimal contracting environments. The 
authors end up concluding that the relative importance of these components 
have changed considerably over time. 
1.3.2.1 Perquisites 
Perquisites comprise a wide variety of goods and services provided to the 
executive. Perquisites tend to be seen as a general signal of weak corporate 
governance once when it is revealed it induces a reduction in firm value that is 
substantially larger than the actual cost of the perquisite itself (Yermack, 2006). 
Frydman and Jenter (2010) also present evidence suggesting that some 
perquisites are, indeed, reflection of managerial excess and reduces shareholder 
value.  
1.3.2.4 Pensions 
Prior to December 2006 American companies were not required to report 
values of executive pensions and so evidence was sparse. Because the lack of 
empirical evidence, Frydman and Jenter (2010), following Sundaram and 
Yermack (2007), estimated annual increases for pension values, for S&P 500 
companies. The authors came to the conclusion that pensions correspond to 
about 35% of the CEO’s total compensation throughout his CEO years. This 
means that “ignoring pensions can result in a significant underestimation of total 
CEO pay”(Frydman & Jenter, 2010, p. 8). 
13 
 
1.3.2.3 Severance Pay 
In this case, empirical evidence is also scarce. Yermack (2006) found that 
“golden handshakes”10 are usual but tend to be modest in value. Apart from this, 
CEOs usually receive a special severance pay, “golden parachute”, which 
accounts for the cases in which CEOs loose their jobs through company 
acquisition.  
1.4. Determinants of CEO Compensation  
It is expected that CEOs work for the best interest of company shareholders. 
However, there is the possibility that things do not go as predicted if instead 
CEOs work for their own interests. Considering this, companies try to align CEOs 
interests with shareholders’ interests by tying CEO compensation to company 
performance. Most studies regarding CEO compensation establish that executive 
pay will depend on the power CEO have over the board as well as firm size. In 
larger firms with powerful CEOs, compensation will be tied to sales, and not to 
performance, ensuring a secure level of compensations against any downfall in 
performance, as an example. 
Not only performance and firm size will determine executive pay. 
Furthermore, company management, duality, board structure, compensation 
consultants and the sharholders gains will also have an impact in compensation 
decision. Even more, it is expected that key human capital variables will impact 
compensation setting process. These variables can be such as investment on 
education, labour experience, but also tenure or even age, as refered by Gomes, 
Ramaswamy and Veliyath (2000) 
                                                 
10 Compensation that is awarded to retiring or fired CEOs. 
  
Figure 2 demonstrates several possible determinants of CEO compensation, 
each one on its framework. In the next sections, we will describe several 
determinants that may influence CEO compensation.  
 
 
Figure 2: Determinants of CEO Compensation (reproduced from Barkema & Gomez-Mejia 
(1998)). 
 
1.4.1. Company Size 
“The operational complexity of larger firms and managing firms with growth 
opportunities and riskier operations, demands higher quality executives with a 
corresponding higher compensation demand.” (Chalmers et al., 2006). The 
authors, studying Australian companies found that firm size is the only 
determinant11 for all the considered compensation components12. These results 
                                                 
11 Amongst other economic determinants such as investment opportunity set, stock return, return on assets and 
fim risk. Authors used LN(Assests) as a proxy for size.  
12 Fixed component, annual bonus, value of options granted, value of shares granted and total compensation.  
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are supported by the theory that larger companies need excellence CEOs and 
have to be willing to pay for such needs.  
There is a wide range of literature connecting CEO compensation and firm size 
(Gomez-Mejia et al. (1987)) that points towards the explanation that in large 
companies the job tend to be more complex and comes with greater 
responsibilities. O’Reiley III, Main and Crystal (1988) found that, for a sample of 
150 companies of Fortune 50013, size is positively related to cash compensation. 
These authors used sales, assets and number of employees as proxies, which are 
highly correlated between them. Khanna (2016) also came to the conclusion that 
size has a positive impact in compensation, when analysing an Indian sample, 
using sales as proxy for size.  
It is expected that under perfectly competitive labour markets CEO 
compensation resemble the marginal revenue product, the incremental profit 
CEO earns for the firm due to inherent management skills.14 This means that 
larger firms, even with a small increase in profit per unit sold, would have higher 
impact in the overall profit since the total number of units sold is larger. 
Consequently, Agarwall (1981) and Roberts (1956) concluded that larger 
companies are in better position to offer higher levels of compensation to their 
CEOs. 
Furthermore, bigger companies usually present much complex structures, 
which leads to the same situation as described before, higher levels of CEO 
compensation. For sure, it can be stated that the size of the company have to be 
strictly attached to the performance, since the greater the performance the larger 
we expect the company to be. For that reason, performance is also a determinant 
of compensation.  
 
                                                 
13 Annual compiled list of the major 500 companies by revenue of USA. 
14 Ultimately, if there is no incremental profit CEO should earn what would be earning in the next best job 
opportunity. 
  
1.4.2. Company Performance 
The expectation behind the relationship established between performance and 
compensation is easily stated and supported by a rather logic economic plea: 
“(…) because the CEO is the individual responsible for the overall performance 
of the organization, rewards should be contingent (…)” (O'Reilly III et al., 1988). 
Despite of what seems a logic argument, literature supply mixed results. It is 
interesting that: "(…) after controlling for size, researchers have not found the 
relation-ship between CEOs' pay and performance to be as strong or consistent 
as the classic economic theories would imply.” (Gomez-Mejia et al., 1987, p. 53). 
As mentioned earlier in this thesis, agency theory states that problems of trust 
arises in companies where shareholders have no control over corporate day-to-
day decisions, since in most companies ownership and control are distinct 
powers. To ensure that their interests prevail when decisions are made they tie 
CEO compensation to firm performance. Jensen and Murphy (1990) addressed 
this topic and discovered that there is a positive statistical significant relationship 
between CEO compensation and shareholders wealth. This means that when 
interests are aligned, CEOs will ensure shareholders interests by ensuring their 
wealth. When shareholders are statisfied with CEO performance they will 
reaward him with increased compensation.  
Regarding performance it is important to point out the case in which the 
compensation is tied to past performance. In this situation the literature suggest 
mixed results. Firstly Jensen and Murphy (1990) found a weak relationship 
between variables. With time this relationship grew and Boschen, Duru, Gordon 
and Smith (2003) found a strong positive connection amongst share-based 
performance and compensation.  
Chalmers, Koh and Stapledon (2006) found a positive connection between 
pay-for-performance and the fixed component of the compensation. Using 
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Return on Asset15 and Stock Return16 as proxies for performance, they found a 
positive significant association between all compensation components and ROA, 
except for shares. This allowed the conclusion that pay-for-performance is a 
preferred mechanism of compensation. Additionally they established a link 
between RET and the bonus component of the pay package. They also discovered 
that contracts are packed with performance goals, which helps lining up 
incentives as Bebchuk and Fried (2004) argued. Within the same line, but 
reaching opposite conclusions, for USA reality, Core et al. (1999) found positive 
connection between RET and compensation and pay-for-performance but not 
when using ROA.  
Studying Indian companies Ramaswamy et al. (2000), demonstrated that 
compensation is positively related with performance, when using ROA as a 
proxy. In another Indian study and using ROA, Khanna (2016) showed a positive 
relationship with CEO compensation. These various findings support the theory 
that CEO compensation tends to be aligned with shareholders interests17.  
Still related to performance, there is some literature showing the association 
amongst “(…) compensation structure and firm performance once executive 
compensation, ownership structure and board composition are ultimately part 
of a simultaneous system that determines the corporation’s value (…)” (Mehran, 
1995, p. 164). The author realised that firm performance was positively related to 
equity-based executive compensation, which, again, supports the tie pay-for-
performance practice18. The explanation for this might be related with the fact 
that, when compensation is tied to performance, CEOs have more motivation to 
make value-maximizing decisions (Grossman & Hart, 1983).  
                                                 
15 From here forward, ROA. This variable states the accounting performance of the company.  
16 From here forward, RET, as defined by the authors. This variable states the market performance of the company.  
17Once CEO compensation is tied to performance indicators CEO and shareholders interests became common. 
18 This also relates to agency theory as a solution for agency problems. 
“The results of standard agency models sugets that the level of pay is an increasing function of firm performance.” 
(Core et al., 1999)  
  
Summing up, literature points towards a positive relationship between 
performance and executive compensation. In this context, the better a company 
performs, as the CEO is responsible for decisions that affect performance, the 
higher his compensation will be.  
 
1.4.3. Board of Directors: Operation and Structure 
Several studies (Yermack (1996); Core et al. (1999); Angbazo and Narayanan 
(1997)) address the effect of Board structure in executive compensation. 19 Most 
of them  indicate that “controlling for the economic determinants of executive 
compensation, Board structure does help to explain cross-sectional variation in 
CEO compensation.”(Chhaochharia & Grinstein, 2009, p. 233). Nevertheless, 
there is some criticism around this evidence as it is seen as inconclusive. This 
happens because board structure is considered an endogenous variable once it is 
determined by firm and CEO features that can not be observed, but that 
determine the CEO pay level. Nonetheless, it is expected that as the Board is 
empowerd to take several crucial decisions, the structure of the Board have 
indeed impact in the CEO compensation.  
Rent extraction theory questions board efficiency. As argued by Chalmers et 
al. (2006), Boards are tendentially passive and dependent on CEO for 
information. Board characteristics such as the above mentioned empowers CEO 
with the capability of extract excessive compensation when comparing to the 
optimal compensation level (Bebchuk et al., 2002). It is then reasonable to 
conclude that poor governance practices 20  regarding Board operations or 
structure amplifies agency problems.  
                                                 
19 Please note that by Board we mean Board of Directors. 
20  Poor governance practices are not only related to board structure or operations. Duality, excessive CEO 
influence or power, conflicts of interest are examples of features that are also understand as poor governance 
practices.  
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As Boyd (1994) stated, Board structure is the most proficient way of 
influencing and controlling top management decisions, ensuring that 
shareholder interests prevail. Then it is expected that Boards watch over CEO 
performance in order to establish the appropriate level of compensation. The 
author also refered that lack of Board surveillance is related to managerial 
devious behaviour, which, in turn, has been connected with board composition. 
Sometimes is the Board21 it self that settles the components and the level of 
CEO compensation. In other cases compensation is established by a 
compensation committee. Since the Compensation Committee is nominated by 
the Board, this means that, in any case, directly or indirectly, Board has influence 
in the compensation settlement process. For that reason, it is important to verify 
how CEO compensation is affected by the delegation mechanism22. To address 
this question some authors, as Ganbaix and Landier (2008), defended that design 
and the level of compensation contracts were set mostly due to the demand for 
talent in the labour market. Many other authors, such as Jensen (1993), point out 
that the delegation mechanism has a significant impact on CEO compensation 
and therefore Board decisions can have nothing to do with labour market values.  
Having theories in mind Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2009) studied the 
relationship between CEO compensation and Board structure, examining the 
influence of director regulation upon executive compensation. They aimend at 
answering the following questions: “How important is the board of directors in 
setting CEO compensation? How do procedural requirements adopted by boards 
affect CEO Compensation decisions?” (Chhaochharia & Grinstein, 2009, p. 231). 
The authors used the effect of the new USA laws on corporate boards to adreess 
these questions.  
                                                 
21 Which represents shareholders. 
22 When shareholders delegate responsibilities to the Board of Directors.  
  
Regarding these new laws, it is important to understand the reason behind 
there implementation. In response to corporate scandals in 2001 and 2002 (e.g. 
Enron) USA stock exchanges came out with new board requirements in order to 
establish further restrictions on structure and operations of boards and to 
enhance board oversight. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act23 and these new rules aimed at 
“(…) strengthen corporate governance practices of listed companies.” (Securities 
and Exchange Commission, 2003). The core requirements of these rules were: 
a) The majority of board members on a board have to be independent; 
b) Members of the compensation, audit and nominating committees must 
be independent; 
c) Compensation and nomination committees must have an agreement that 
specifies their obligations. Also they should have self assessment 
measures;  
d) Non-management board directors should meat regularly in executive 
meetings, without management so that they can act in a more effective 
and independent way, supervising management; 
e) Specific written procedures must be adopted to evaluate CEOs and to 
elect new board members.  
Taking this into account Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2009) tested whether 
these new requirements had impact on compensation decisions.  
The authors found that there is a requirement that is strongly correlated with 
decreases in compensation24: the independence of board members. They found 
that interesting as the independence requirement do not necessarily means that 
there will be any substantial effect. CEOs tend to nominate their directors and so, 
even though there is a legal requirement for director independence, they may not 
be truly independent, since most of the time they might feel indebted to the CEO 
(Jensen, 1993). However, the new nomination procedures diminished CEO 
                                                 
23 From here forward, Sox Act.  
24 This significant compensation drops arise from declines in bonus and stock-based compensation.  
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presence in the election of new directors, making them more likely to be actually 
independent.  
Still about Board independency, Bebchuk and Fried (2004) defined those 
directors as the ones that are not, and have never been, employed and also hold 
no other relationship with the company. As argued by Zahra and Pearce (1989) 
boards should be composed by independent directors due to influence issues and 
conflicts of interest. Fama and Jensen (1983) claimed that the status of 
independent diretors acts as an incentive to defend their reputation as sources of 
expertise as they focus on leverage firm performance. Nonetheless, Essen, Otten 
and Carberry (2015) argued that there are several ways for directors to loose their 
independence and becoming more exposed to executive power. As examples, 
CEOs involved in the election of directors, intensified collaboration over time 
between directors and CEO, shared interests between executives. Despite this, 
the authors expected that independent directors were better positioned to limit 
executive power than dependent ones.  
Coming back to, Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2009), the authors focused on 
the argument of Fama and Jensen (1983) that, outside directors, who do not have 
any type of affiliation with the company or company officers, should be the ones 
to make compensation decisions. That is because these directors are better 
positioned to make fair judgements about CEO performance, efficient 
compensation, hiring and dismissing decisions. However, once more the 
problem of directors not being truly independent arises. Furthermore, a 
monitoring problem upsurge from the limited time that board members have. As 
Bebchuk and Fried (2003) argued, these problems do have an impact when it 
come to compensation disposals and, once there is a shortage of board oversight 
that can lead to suboptimal compensation practices. 
Hallock (1997), using Forbes 500 firms, discovered that board structure could 
explain cross-sectional variation in compensation. He found that when 
  
companies have directors that sit in each other boards25 the level of compensation 
of both CEOs tend to be higher. Core et al. (1999), studying the level of CEO 
compensation in large USA firms, found that CEO compensation is positively 
correlated with the CEO involvement in the nomination of Board directors, as 
Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2009) also found. However, Core et al. (1999) went 
even further: CEO compensation tends to increase as the percentage of affiliated 
directors grow; it also tends to increase when there isn’t a single director that 
holds considerable stake in the company; when CEO also comprises Board chair 
role26 (also found by Cyerte (2002)), and lastly, when there is a large number of 
Board directors.  
Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2009) pointed out several explanations for the 
compensation reaction to the independent compensation committee, imposed by 
SOX Act. First, the fact that Board is in charge of the nomination of the 
compensation committee and therefore, the Board ultimately decides how well 
informed and in possession of proper negotiation skills the committee is. Second, 
the Board approves the recommendations made by the compensation committee 
and, because of that, Board composition and nomination process will ultimately 
affect the compensation decisions.  
It is important to emphasize that these independence requirements not only 
produce the above-mentioned effects on CEO compensation, but can also 
produce some side effects. Firms that are not as much compliant with the 
requirements, as other companies, will be, in theory, more affected by other 
requirements coming from the Board itself. These requirements can be such as 
“written charter to explain the compensation policy of the firm, the requirement 
for a performance evaluation of the committees, and the requirement for Board 
sessions without management” (Chhaochharia & Grinstein, 2009). These Board 
                                                 
25 Interlocking relations. 
26 Chairman. 
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requests will affect the compensation through the need of compliance with good 
practices.  
Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2009) finally came to the conclusion that the 
companies that were least compliant with the new regulation that the SOX 
imposed decreased their CEO compensation on the order of 17%. This reinforces 
that board structure and board procedures have a significant impact on the 
structure and level of CEO compensation. Board features have a major impact in 
the settlement of compensation practices, before and after the SOX requirements. 
However, the question if these Board changes lead to optimal situation to 
shareholders27, can still be raised. Some authors such as Bebchuck and Fried 
(2003) suggested that changing Board structure tends to diminish the influence 
that managerial power have over boards, and as a result should enlarge 
shareholder value. Nevertheless, the same changes could also have a negative 
impact on shareholder value. If boards become so strict that CEO compensation 
is not enough, nor fair, according to CEO’s true value28, may cause that qualified 
and talented CEOs will not be willing to work in those firms.  
Other authors also refered that characteristics such as Board size matters to 
compensation level, by facilitating and strengthening managerial power (van 
Essen et al., 2015). The authors argued that, the larger the board, the harder is to 
achieve internal concensus, and for that reason more likely to entrench in higher 
levels of executive power. Bebchuk and Fried (2004) added that the 
inoperativeness of larger boards can be related to poor inner coordination and 
communication difficulties. Along the same lines, Zahra and Pearce (1989) 
outlined the tendency to consistency amongst smaller boards clashing with the 
effort and time that has to be taken to build up cohesive larger boards.  
                                                 
27 If they increase shareholder value; what should be the ultimate purpose. 
28 Value of their managerial talent. 
  
Additionally Grinstein and Hribar (2004), analysed the impact of CEO power 
over Boards on the size of bonus that they are awarded for acquiring another 
company. As mentioned earlier, in this singular situation, the bonus is higher 
when CEO plays a role in the nomination of board directors, and when CEO is 
also Board chair. Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2009) recognised that despite the 
vast literature that relates board structure and compensation practices, it is 
harder to establish from there that “board structure has a causal effect on 
compensation practices”, since both variables are endogenous and determined 
by unobservable firm and CEO features.  
Regarding Board characteristics, it is possible to conclude that independence 
of Board members might have a negative impact when determining 
compensation. The more independent the Board, the more impartial is the Board 
judgement and evaluation of CEO’s work. 
 
1.4.4. Compensation Consultants: Existence and Structure 
Adoption of compensation consultants has become a widespread practice in 
the corporate world as pointed out by Kabir and Minhat (2014). “The consultants 
do not only offer advices on whether to pay with bonus, options, shares, etc., but 
also on how much each compensation component should be.” (Kabir & Minhat, 
2014, p. 172). There are two distinct insights that literature takes on the role of 
compensation consultants. On one hand, Conyon, Peck and Sadler (2009), saw 
them as providers of valuable services that helps companies in accomplishing 
optimal compensation. On the other hand, Bebchuck and Fried (2003) saw them 
as a mechanism for firms to justify higher pay grants. Ogden and Watson (2012) 
claimed that consultants make it easier to firms to attract and retain executives of 
the appropriate quality, experience and skills that are necessary in order to attain 
success. 
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Several studies (Murphy and Sandino (2010) and Conyon et al. (2009)) state 
that most of the UK and USA companies have compensation consultants working 
for them. These studies also address the fact that CEOs in those companies 
receive higher compensation when comparing to CEOs in firms that do not 
employ any consultant. 
The role of compensation consultants on executive compensation can be 
studied through three perceptions: efficient or optimal contracting theory, rent 
extraction or managerial power theory, and resource dependency theory. 
Regarding the first one, consultants provide expert advice and valuable 
information that help Board of Directors in designing and structure executive 
pay29 so that manager-shareholder interest alignment can take place (Conyon et 
al., 2009). Conyon et al. (2019) argued that this specifically happens when 
consultants work within an independent committee, as this lead to efficient 
interest alignement and reduces moral hazard, as stated by Fama and Jensen 
(1983), which is present in principal agent relationships.  
Along with the SOX Act requirements for independent Compensation 
Committee there are studies addressing this topic. These consultants appear as 
an important variable since large companies tend to rely on executive 
compensation consultants to give advice on suitable pay levels and packages, to 
design and implement incentive plans, for the short or long-term. These 
consultants will not only help making decisions compensation wise but also 
deliver “(…) competitive-benchmarking information on industry and market 
pay practices.” (Murphy & Sandino, 2010, p. 247). It is important to outline that 
there are consultants that are only executive compensation focused and others 
offering a range of compensation, benefits and other human resources services. 
It is logical, in the latter case, that compensation consultants must face potential 
                                                 
29 In the cases that companies do not have a compensation committee. If they do, the compensation committee is 
composed by compensation consultants that decide on compensation package.  
  
conflicts of interest, which can lead to higher levels of CEO pay. In this matter, 
critics of apparent abuses allege consultants as being compliant with apparent 
excesses in compensation. This accusation is focused on two sources of conflicts 
which Murphy and Sandino (2010) call “repeat business” and “other services”. 
“Repeat business” establishes that compensation consultants, who have been 
engaged not by the compensation committee but by the management, work for 
and with the head of human resources, Chief Financial Officer30 and CEO. This 
creates conflicts of interest because consultants recommend on the pay of the 
people who hire them, and might hire for “repeat business”. The second one, 
“other services” comes because the fees that are paid to consultants for other 
services 31  tend to be much larger than the fees paid for the development of 
executive pay recommendations. These other services also create conflicts of 
interest by themselves since “the decisions to engage the consulting firm in these 
more-lucrative corporate-wide consulting areas are often made or influenced by 
the same top executives who are benefited or harmed by the consultant’s 
executive pay recommendations.” (Murphy & Sandino, 2010, p. 248). 
The authors studied both, USA and Canada, cases because Securities 
Exchange Commission 32  required companies to identify and define the role 
played by consultants on providing advice on executive compensation, and to 
unveil if the consultants are engaged directly by Compensation Committee or by 
management. The authors found evidence that CEO pay is higher in companies 
in which the consultant, not only advise about executive compensation, but also 
provides other services. USA CEOs receive about 18% more, and Canadian CEOs 
33% more, when consultants provide not only executive services but also other 
                                                 
30 From here forward, CFO. 
31 By other services, we mean all services provided by consultants that are not compensation related. As an 
example: “(…) actuarial services, benefits administration services, insurance services, employee-pay services, tax 
services, pension fund asset management, employee training non-pension actuaria work, HR outsourcing (…)” 
(Hsu et al., 2014)  
32 From here forward, SEC.  
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services to the company. Likewise, executive pay is higher in Canadian firms 
when consultants receive higher fees for other services than for executive 
compensation services, and when consultants provide actuarial services. CEO 
compensation in USA, will be greater in firms where consultants work solely for 
the compensation committee or the board.  
Along with this study but with opposite results Conyon et al. (2009), while 
examining UK companies found no evidence of higher CEO compensation in 
firms where compensation consultants provided other services. Moreover, for a 
USA sample, Cadman, Carter and Hillegeist (2010), did not found evidence to 
proof that conflicts of interest lead to higher levels of payment. Moreover Hsu et 
al. (2014) found evidence that compensation and non-compensation-related 
services33 are positively connected. Adittionally the authors set that NCS tend to 
diminish pay-performance sensitivity.  
Kabir and Minhat (2014) stated that although there is literature regarding 
consultants and their impact in CEO compensation the phenomenon that can 
come from employing not just one but numerous consultants remains 
unexplored. Since consultants do not come cheap for companies the authors 
found it interesting to verify how CEOs benefit from having multiple consultants 
as well as how CEOs benefit from employing compensation consultants holding 
large market shares (Kabir & Minhat, 2014). Using a sample of UK listed firms34, 
the authors also studied how CEO compensation reacted to increases or 
decreases in the number of compensation consultants along consecutive years. 
The authors verified that CEOs have much higher equity-based pay when 
firms employ more than one compensation consultant, this even “(…) after 
                                                 
33 From here forward NCS (non-compensation-related services). By non-compensation-related services, we mean 
the same as other services. 
 
34 In contrast to USA companies, UK companies started to provide information regarding consultants prior to 
December 2006. 
  
controlling for firm, corporate governance and CEO characteristics.”(Kabir & 
Minhat, 2014, p. 173).35 In addition, they found that when there is an increase in 
the number of consultants this is accompanied with rises in equity-based 
compensation. The authors stand by the fact that firms tendentially hire two or 
more consultants so that they are able to justify higher level of compensation. 
Although the tendency is larger compensation when there are more consultants, 
the opposite is not verified. This means that there is no decline on CEO pay when 
the number of consultants is reduced. Finally, the authors found that market 
share of compensation consultants and CEO pay are positively related. The larger 
the CEO compensation, the higher will be the consultant market share. 
This may raise some questions as to whether consultants purposely advise 
higher compensation so that they can grant their business interests. The topic can 
also be addressed as higher CEO compensation reflecting the competition that 
takes place amongst consultants. Nonetheless, it is important to understand that 
higher CEO pay can also be driven by strategy. It is also significant to address 
that the increasing equity-based compensation when companies have multiple 
compensation consultants suggest that pay consultants compete “in facilitating 
firms to attract executives with the right talents by advising toward higher 
equity-based pay” (Kabir & Minhat, 2014, p. 173). This because as Arya and 
Mittendorf (2005) stated, equity-based pay is seen as an efficient way to match 
managerial pay and managerial capacity. 
It might be interesting, regarding consultant independence and potential 
conflicts of interest, to make the inevitable comparison with auditor 
independence. Literature (DeAngelo (1981) and Kinney et al. (2004)) explain why 
independence is crucial to audit quality and how conflicts arise when there are 
other services, beyond auditing, carried out by auditors. These conflicts led to 
                                                 
35 It is important to outline that these authors do not take the independency factor into account. They only account 
for the number of consultants despite the fact that they might be independent or not.  
29 
 
SOX Act, detailed disclosures of fees charged for auditing and non-auditing 
business, requirements. These ultimately led to firms avoiding using their 
auditors for other necessary services, despite the fact they might be the proficient 
providers of such services.  
Concluding, literature points towards two possible impacts in compensation, 
led by consultants. The first one is the number of compensation consultants, 
which tendentially have a positive impact in CEO compensation level. The 
second one, however, shows a positive relationship between the compensation 
consultants’ independence and CEO compensation.  
 
1.4.5. Ownership: Company Management structure  
The relationship between stakeholders and management fit easily in the 
definition of agency relation. Agency theory goes even further suggesting that 
once control and ownership are separated powers, this causes agency problems, 
as interests between shareholders and managers may not be aligned.  
If companies are family or professionally owned, could have a significant 
impact in CEO compensation since the CEO itself can be a family member or not. 
In family managed companies the tendency is to have fewer conflicts of interest 
once ownership and control are centralized powers. 36  Generally it could be 
expected higher CEO compensation when companies are family managed than 
when they are professionally managed, given the fact that the first ones have 
ownership and control in the same hands. However, this is not the case. 
Family managed firms are associated with secure employment for CEOs, 
many times sacrificing huge earnings over security as Schulze, Lubatkin and 
Dino (2001) showed. Moreover, it is unlikely that family CEOs compete in labour 
market and seek the next best job offer (Gomez-Mejia, Gutierrez, &, Nunez-
                                                 
36 In the opposite side, professionally managed companies have segregated authorities. 
  
Nickel 2001). This “family handcuff” (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2003, p. 227) will 
diminish the need to appropriately compensate the family CEO to match the 
market, and will keep their pay package below the average and the professional 
CEO. This situation happens when the CEO is the actual owner, but also when 
the CEO is family related to the owner (Gomez-Mejia, Larraza-Kintana, & Makri, 
2003). The authors also point out that it is expectable that, the greater the level of 
family ownership, the more security is granted to the family CEO, and the lower 
the CEO is exposed to risk. By sheltering family members for the negative 
consequences that they could be exposed once in the labour market the CEO will 
be offered less earnings.  
“Family CEOs possess spontaneous and superior incentives, and monetary 
compensation is only one source of their utility function, family CEOs have less 
need to receive additional compensation from the firm for their equity capital.” 
(Young & Tsai, 2008, p. 373). Firms that seek to attract and retain expert CEOs, 
will have, by the means of compensation to align interests. Aligning “(…)CEOs' 
compensation with their social networking efforts motivates them to build, 
develop, and use equity capital to create value for stakeholders.” (Young & Tsai, 
2008, p. 373), which is the ultimate purpose of the shareholders.  
It is important to feature what defines a family owned company. Anderson 
and Reeb (2003) state that family owned companies are the ones in which the 
founder, or a member of his family is the blockholder. Amit and Villalong (2006) 
add the need for control mechanisms, as voting rights. The authors, for a Fortune 
500 sample, found out that family ownership only creates value for a company 
in situations in which the CEO is also Chairman. Despite not being a direct 
impact in compensation this could pontentially influence compensation 
indirectly via duality or company performance. Khanna (2016), with a sample of 
300 Indian companies reached the conclusion that family management presents 
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a positive relation with CEO compensation. This was a surprising result for the 
author since literature and himself predicted the opposite. 
In the case of non-family owned companies, there are two possible situations: 
large concentrated owners or free-float. This latter situation is where investors 
hold a small portion of shares making them not significant to decision-making 
process. In the first case, investors tend to look after their interests by both 
electing directors and straight communication with management as argued by 
Smith (1996). This happens because, as large investors, they are more reliant to 
firm performance and so the incentive to monitor magament is higher. In free-
float reality, the cost of monitoring management can be too high to dispersed 
owners once the possible gains are not that great. Also, Thomsen and Pedersen 
(2000), as well as Becker (2006), argued that, the more dispersed the shareholders 
are, the more likely it is that strategies to increase firm value are different, leaving 
management more empowered. This is consistent with the theory that 
empowered management can extract higher level of compensation.  
It is also interesting to address what Core, Holthausen and Larcker (1999) and 
Khan, Dharwadkar and Brandes (2005) found out. The authors discovered that 
having blockholders that hold 5% or more, have a negative impact in the level of 
CEO compensation. This comes along with the conclusion reached by Bebchuk 
and Fried (2004) and Sleifer and Vishny (1997) that relationship between 
company performance and executive pay is stronger when the concentration 
level of ownership is higher. This may be justified by the early mentioned fact 
that concentrated shareholders tend to constrain managerial power by 
supervising and ensuring that decisions are in line with shareholders understand 
of value-added decisions. 
Another interesting feature regarding ownership that can impact CEO 
compensation is the owner identity. In this case it is adressed whether the owners 
  
are institutional investors or non-institutional investors 37 . The status of 
institutional investor does not come with addittional formal power. These 
investors frequently have holdings and fiduciary responsibilities to increase the 
earnings of their clients. For this reason Carberry, Essen and Otten (2015) state 
that they monitor management more actively and also have more influence in 
restraining executive power. Also, Chourou, Abaoub and Saadi (2008) found that 
with highly dispersed ownerhip structure the individuals tend to pursue their 
own goals instead of the shareholders interests which could lead to excessive 
compensation and absence of pay-for-performance sensitivity.  
Gomez-Mejia et al. (2003) studied the determinants of CEO compensation in 
family-controlled public corporations. For a sample of USA companies, they 
found a negative correlation between CEO compensation and family ties. 
Gomez-Mejia et al. (2001) supported the explanation for such negative 
correlation: family ties induce the feel of higher job assurance. It is also expectable 
that performance evaluations are positively biased when there is emotional 
attachments between employees. This is interesting because as it can lead to 
statements of misfortune when company performance is not satisfying. In these 
cases, it is likely that the Board give the beenift of the doubt rather than replacing 
the CEO based on incompetence statement.  
Concluding, ownership can affect compensation in many ways. If the 
companies are family owned, CEO compensation is expected to be lower, when 
comparing to professionally owned ones. The dimension of the blockholder is 
another ownership feature that might influence compensation, since larger 
blockholders show higher levels of power and control.  
                                                 
37 It is important to notice the difference between institutional and non-institutional investors. The first ones trade 
great numbers of shares, with great expertise, act with a prespetive of long-run and tend to assume greater risk 
when the return is higher. Commonly this investors are financial institutions such as banks, investement funds or 
pension funds. The second one represents th individual by itself, with much less know-how and trading few shares 
with a short-run intent and risk aversion profile.  
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1.4.6. Duality: The role of CEO and Chairman  
Considering duality,38 means to look after the cases in which Chairman and 
CEO role in a firm are within the same person. Agency theory states that CEO 
and Board Chairman are different entities with disctinct roles in a company. This 
means that these powers cannot cope with duality. In cases that Chairman and 
CEO are the same individual, Board capability and power to make decisions is 
biased and so compensation tend to be higher than in situations of separate 
power. This power centralization brings a wider capacity and control over pay 
setting decisions to the individual. Therefore, it is expected that when duality 
does exist within a company, greater levels of compensation will arise. 
For this matter, several empirical studies showed that the relationship 
between variables is indeed positive. Agrawal, Makhija and Mandelker (1991), 
with a sample of 118 electric and gas companies,39 claimed that when duality is 
present,40 the individual get the highest total compensation. Dorata and Petra 
(2008) also found evidence that CEO duality has a significant positive impact 
when it come to setting CEO compensation. The authors go even further in 
arguing that when duality is present, performance based factors turn out to be 
not that significant, when it comes to establishing the level of compensation.  
Similarly, Boyd (1994) found a positive relationship between duality and 
executive pay, as also addressed the fact that duality blures the impartial CEO 
performance assessment. This biased evaluation contributes also to a biased 
                                                 
38 Please note that CEO duality is a particular aspect of board composition. As there are many studies addressing 
this variable and the impact in compensation it seemed rather important to deepen the discussion of this variable 
by its self.  
39 From the New York Stock Exchange or the American Stock Exchange, for a 10 year period (1975-1984). 
40 Note that the authors stratified duality in various ways. In which concerns to our study, we focused on the CEO-
T and CHM-T variables.  
CEO-T: CEOs who also hold the position of chairman. 
CHM-T: Chairman who also hold the position of CEO. 
As mentioned by the authors these are overlapping groups and for that reason, for our study purposes we are 
revweing them as one.  
  
Board41, meaning that CEO duality has a negative impact in Board control and 
inependency. In a different angle, Khanna (2016), showed no significant 
relationship between Duality and CEO compensation. The same conclusions 
were reached by Conyon and Peck (1998), for a sample of UK FTSE 10042 listed 
companies, as they found no evidence that duality somehow leads to increased 
compensation. 
Literature shows a positive relationship between duality and CEO 
compensation. This migh happen as when the CEO also takes place as head of 
the Board, Chairman, the power to influence and to make decisions, 
compensation or non-compensation related, at CEO disposal is enormous. 
 
1.4.7. Age and Tenure  
The rational behind the theory that age and tenure have a positive contribution 
to the level of compensation is simple. Tendentially age translates in the 
experience factor: an older manager has more accumulated experience and 
specific relevant knowledge,43 than a younger one. In the same way tenure arises 
as a determinant once the longer a manager remains in his role or position within 
a company, the more knowledge and accumulated experience, the better he is 
known, and therefore the easier it will be to get higher compensation. 
Additionally, it can be argued that tenure gives the CEO the time to create the 
basis to power practice, what recquires some time to achieve. “(…) with a longer 
(…)tenure with the firm, has had a longer period of time to achieve “track record” 
                                                 
41 The Board Topic will be addressed in the next section, section 3.7. 
42 Financial Times Stock Exchange 100 Index. Share index of the 100 companies with higher market capitalisation 
on the London Stock Exchange.  
43 Several authors used age as a proxy for human capital, see Finkelstein and Hambrick (1989) and Mayers and Jr. 
(1992) as an example.  
The authors assume that as more years of work experience come with more capacities, CEOs must be rewarded 
for this feature. The reaward is intended as iher compensation.  
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and to forge relationships with the corporate level (…). to increase political 
power, tenure may also increase human capital through increased experience.” 
(Fisher & Govindarajan, 1992, p. 208). 
Despite the intuitive outcome of this relation between age and compensation, 
empirical results were not conclusive. Ingham and Thompson (2009) found that 
within the UK building society sector the age had an important role in the CEO 
compensation level raises. In the same line, the conclusions reached by Deckop 
(1988, p. 220) point out that “(…) age does not seem to be positively related to 
CEO Compensation and it may actually be a liability.” The liability explanation 
can lay in firms attempt to address potencial long term problems by hiring 
younger CEOs: “The younger the indivual, the longer his prospective 
employment tenure with the firm, and less likely it should be that his 
investement decisions on behalf of the firm will be myopic. In addition, the 
discipline of the external labor market should be stronger to younger executives 
(…)” (Lewellen, Loderer, & Martin, 1987, p. 290). 
Even thought Monti-Belkaoui and Riahi-Belkaoui (1993), with a sample of 
Fortune 500 companies, came to a positive conclusion regarding age and to the 
opposite of the expected conclusion regarding tenure. The authors detected that 
not only there were direct effects of the mentioned variables in compensation but 
also there were interaction effects. These effects are featured as age-tenure and 
age-years interactions44. In the first kind of interaction they found a positive 
relationship with CEO compensation due to the fact that older CEOs with a 
longer term of office have higher compensation levels. Regardless of the fact that 
tenure by itself does not contributes for higher pay, when related to age, it leads 
to higher levels of remuneration. This might be explained by the loyalty with firm 
                                                 
44 I tis importante to outline the difference between tenure and years as CEO. When we refer to tenure, we mean 
the number of years of the term of office of a designated CEO in a specific company. When we refer to number of 
years as CEO, we mean the number of years that the individual has played the role of CEO amongst various 
companies. 
  
factor. On the other hand, the age-years as CEO interaction, that has a negative 
impact in the settlement of compensation. The reason behind this, lays in the fact 
that younger CEOs tend to be better paid once labour market favours them. 
Younger CEOs can pursue market established levels of compensation that tend 
to be higher than when it is internally determined.  
Lastly, it is interesting to mention the conclusion reached by Finkelstein and 
Hambrick (1989). Analysing the effect of age on CEO pay they discovered that it 
has an inverted U-shaped relationship. This means that compensation tends to 
vary in the same way as age but just until hitting a certain point, which the author 
pointed out to be at the age of 59.45 After this inflection point compensation starts 
to decrease, varying in the opposite way to age. The authors point out a possible 
explanation for this phenomenon: “This pattern of earnings over time is in line 
with a CEO’s need for cash, which tends to dropp off as he or she gets older and 
no longer has major house and children-rearing expenses.” (1989).  
The results found are not conclusive to either variables. However, it seems 
reasonable that, to the extent, the longer an individual has been CEO the more 
likely it is that compensation is biased by his role. This may happen, not only due 
to human capital factors, but also due to power to influence the compensation 
setting process as explained by O’Reilly III et al. (1988). 
 
1.4.8. Economic Sector 
One variable that can also contribute to level of CEO compensation is the 
economic sector46 in which the company is included. It is known that for different 
industries there will be diverse levels of top management compensation. Another 
                                                 
45 The inflection point is the maximum of the compensation function meaning that is where the earnings are the 
highest.  
46 By adressing company economic sector we are taking into account the various sectors within industry or services 
sector.  
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note that has been taken into account is that there might be some treatys that 
allow companies to pay higher, or lower, levels of compensations regardless of 
the different company features, taken into account just the economic sector 
(O'Reilly III et al., 1988). 
Despite this, Ramaswamy et al. (2000) found that industry effects were not as 
common once only one of his three industry dummies were statiscally 
significant.47 The authors still refered that the findings are consistent with the 
investments that were taking place in India. This may lead to conclude that 
compensation might be tied to industry sector, not only because of the economic 
sector itself, but also to keep up with investment trends. 
Chalmers et al., (2006) discovered that CEOs in smaller, or with financial 
performance above the industry average, companies had more ability to extract 
rents, as bonus or options, for a one year period.48 Despite the fact that it is not a 
direct relationship between compensation and industry, it is an indirect tie that 
indeed might have impact in compensation. 
Chourou et al., (2008) also tested industry effects. They found that CEOs in 
financial sector are offered fewer stock options as compensation, when 
comparing to other sectors. This is consistent with the statements of Smith and 
Watts (1992) and Demsetz and Lehn (1985) that this may be due to the sector 
being regulated. Once management discretion is less likely in regulated sectors 
than in unregulated ones, executives have reduced need for stock-based 
compensation. 
Given the examined literature, the effect of the economic sector in CEO 
compensation is undetermined. The expected impact migh vary with the sector 
itself, with investment trends, with time frame, and with market competitors. In 
                                                 
47 The dummy that is statiscally significant is the “industrial machinery and equipement” sector. In this situation 
the CEO of this sector is compensated in a higher level than their peers amongst other sectors.  
48 This relates to the theory of rent extraction explained in section 1. 
  
this context, it is not possible to determine a precise effect that economic sector 
might have in compensation.  
1.4.9. Key Human Capital Variables: Personal Features 
Key Human capital variables may have an effect on the settlement of 
compensation. These variables might be crucial when deciding to hire a CEO. 
Companies, in a competitive labour market, wanting to hire a top quality CEO, 
might take into account features such as tenure, age, work experience, length of 
time working in the company and investment on education49 (O'Reilly III et al., 
1988). Some authors (Gerhart and Milkovich (1990) and Finkelstein and 
Hambrick (1989)) pointed out that this key human capital variables are such as: 
training, experience, tenure and carrer path. 
As Mincer and Ofek (1982) stated, individuals that devote effort in learning 
and developing skills and experience that matter for labour market should be 
awarded. Despite the simple thinking behind this statements, Gomez-Mejia et al. 
(1987) did not found strong empirical evidence to ensure links between these 
variables. Becker (1993) studied the relationship between key human capital 
variables and compensation. The author suggested that personal attributes as 
investement in training, education and labour market experience show value to 
the employers once they indicate managerial talent, and for that reason may be 
important when settling compensation premiuns.  
It is also interesting to assess characteristics such as being a company insider 
or outsider CEO, and being generalist versus a specialist CEO, and its impacts in 
compensation levels. Outsiders are the CEOs that are appointed from outside the 
company, meaning that insiders are the ones who are appointed from inside 
(Brockman, Lee, & Salas, 2016). The authors also referenced that when addressing 
                                                 
49 The first two variables, age and tenure were addressed seperatly in section 3.7. 
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generalist and specialist they address the skills that the CEO have and is hired 
for. 
The findings where consisten with Murphy (2002) and Murphy and Zabojnik 
(2004) that found that outsider CEOs receive higher compensation. Regarding 
skills, the findings were also consistent with Murphy and Zabojnik (2004) and 
Frydman and Saks (2010) stating that generalist skilled CEOs tend to receive 
higher levels of compensation. However, the Brockman, Lee and Salas (2016) 
went further and discovered that the generalist-outsider combination is the one 
to get higher pay, followed by generalist-insiders, specialist-outsiders, and lastly 
specialist-insiders. 
As discussed before, the expectancy regarding tenure, lays in a positive 
relationship with compensation. When accounting for investment in education 
and work experience, the positive impact of these variables on compensation, is 
also expected. 
 
1.4.10. Total Shareholders Return  
Total Shareholders Return50 became a significant measure when accounting 
for pay-for-performance measurement. TSR arised as a measure for shareholders 
value which is directly related to CEOs performance. Nicola, Giuseppe, Martina 
and Giuseppe (2016) attempted to asses the relationship between CEO 
compensation and TSR, to Italian listed companies. The authors used TSR as a 
proxy for firm performance 51  but, nonetheless, they found no significant 
relationship between those variables. In the same line, Bank and Georgiev (2015) 
argued that TSR was not a trustworthy measure for performance because of the 
possible distortions by unique events, meaning it would be influenced by 
                                                 
50 From here forward TSR. Financial index that represents the rate of returns that shareholders receive.  
51 As suggested by Institutional Shareholder Services agency.  
  
external economic factors. Canarella and Nourayi (2008) suggested that the 
relationship between compensation and firm performance is asymmetric, 
characterized by pay and market returns52 correlation, meaning that TSR does 
have an effect on compensation. 
In the opossit side, when it comes to findings, Gregory-Smith, Thompson and 
Wright (2014) found that CEO pay and TSR were positively correlated, which 
suggested correlation between performance CEO compensation. Also, Buck, Liu 
and Skovoroda (2008), regarding Chinese companies, also found a positive, and 
highly sensible, relationship between TSR and compensation.  
Regarding compensation it is known that the variable component of the 
compensation, as option shares, tend to be indexed on growth in earings per 
share. However, when it comes to the long-term incentive plans companies tend 
to use TSR over a period of time. Ozkan (2007) argued that the most common 
measure used to rate compensation is TSR. In this sense, “CEOs are rewarded for 
their relative total shareholder return compared to an index or a group of peers.” 
(Ozkan, 2007, p. 354). The author also refered that TSR tends to be a better 
performance measure once it keeps the alignment with shareholder return, and 
it is harder to manipulate by managers when comparing to earnings.  
Despite the use of TSR as proxy for performance, Burgman and Van Clieaf 
(2012) argued that, in fact, TSR measures shifts in shareholders prospects about 
upcoming cashflows. This means that, not only measures economic profit but 
also, changes to economic performance. There is the need to clarify that TSR is a 
measure of company performance by itself. 
Nonetheless, in this thesis it is explored on its own once TSR is understood as 
the performance that shareholders see in the company. Firm performance 
defined by ROA, as an example, translates the actual performance of the core 
                                                 
52 Market returns measured by TSR.  
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business, but do not translate in earnings for the investment that shareholders 
took. TSR will be used as a measure of shareholders return, as it is 
understandable that it may have an impact in the CEO level of compensation.  
In this context it is expected that TSR migh have a positive impact in CEO 
compensation. If shareholders are pleased with CEO and company performance, 
which translates in higher earnings for the, the prospect of higher compensations 
is more likely.  
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Chapter 2: Regulatory Framework 
The implementation of SOX Act53, as mentioned before, aimed to build up 
corporate governance practices. The ultimate purpose was the protection of 
shareholders and the public from accounting mistakes and fraudulent practices, 
as the regulatation came as an answer to the corporate scandals witnessed in 
2000/2001 like Enron or WorldCom. Also, it aimed to diminish poor governance 
practices. Approved in the USA congress in 2002, SOX required an independent 
Board, independent compensation, audit and nominating committee and specific 
procedures that evaluate the CEO and the election of new board members.  
Adressing the real impact that SOX had in US companies, Cianci, Fernando 
and Werner (2011) discovered that regulation limited the impact of duality in 
CEO compensation. However, and despite the independence pursued in all parts 
of governance structure, the authors found that SOX did not contributed to the 
loss of CEO power in influencing his own compensation. Chhaochharia and 
Grinstein (2009) also reached some conclusions concerning compensation: CEO 
pay tended to decrease considerably in firms that did not comply with SOX 
requirements, comparing with the firms that indeed complyed with those rules.  
It can be concluded that most of the requirements have to do with 
independence issues. In this context, it can be claimed that when CEOs are not 
independent from the board this will have some effect in the compensation 
                                                 
53 From here forward SOX 
  
settlement, once in these situations CEOs are endowed with a reasonable amount 
of power within the Board. 
Also addressing Corporate Governance rules, it is important to outline that 
Portuguese Securities Market Comission 54  set out the Regulation nº1/2007 
(CMVM, 2007). The mentioned regulation changed the structure of the Corporate 
Governance report. Adittionally, it also allowed the disclosure of the report to be 
done in accordance to the Corporate Governance Code provided by CMVM. 
Regulation nº1/2010 (CMVM, 2010) was the one to revoke nº1/2007 (CMVM, 
2007). This 2010 regulation was the first to introduce, in the Corporate 
Governance report, the disclosing of the remuneration policy 55  and the 
ammounts that come as a result of that policy, not only on an aggregated level, 
but also at an individual level. 56  In addition, this regulation required the 
disclosure of the variable and fixed components of compensation, pension rights, 
as well as, the compensation received from other group companies. 
Furthermore, as the previous regulation, it allowed companies to choose the 
most suitable Corporate Governance Code. The conditions for this were 
compliance with the widely accepted principles and practices, and ensurance 
protection of shareholders interests, have at least the same matters, as well as, 
transparency level similar to the one provided by the CMVM one.  
The regulation was approved in 2010 but started producing effects only by 
2011. This regulation was then replaced by Regulation nº4/2013 (“CMVM - 
Regulamento da CMVM n.o 4/2013,” 2013) that reviewed the content of the code, 
and also, reinforced the recommendation for companies to follow the CMVM 
code or a widely and well accepted code. These regulations allowed a 
                                                 
54 From here forward, CMVM 
55 Law nº 28/2009 (AR, 2009) established that public interest entities had to submit and approve on general 
meeting, on na annual basis, a compensation policy statement.  
56 Article 3rd 
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development of the quality and transparency of the information presented in the 
reports as well as the increase of the available and provided information. 
With the same purpose, and the intent of perceiving possible fraud, error or 
lack of independency the Portuguese Institute of Corporate Governance57 created 
the Corporate Governance Report, a public statement that companies must do, 
at least, on an annual basis58. The first code was published in 2012 and several 
suggestions for ammendements lead to the 2014 version of the code. This was the 
moment when it becames obvious that there was no reason for the Portuguese 
market to have two different codes – one by IPCG and one by CMVM. 
Attempting to solve this matter CMVM cooperated closely with IPCG on the 
groundwork of a new document, published in 2018, that would fulfil the needs 
of both organizations but more importantly clarify the information users.  
It is important to outline that despite of legal bond that listed companies have 
to adopt a Corporate Governance Code, this is not mandatory. The code is based 
on company compliance and explanation ground. The code aims to induce 
companies for practices that are in accordance with the national and worldwide 
adopted and accepted guidelines. The code is not part of the Portuguese 
legislation but it is on a systematic articulation with the capital market and 
company law seeking, this way, the “(…) harmonious complementariness of the 
law.” (“IPCG - Instituto Português de Corporate Governance” 2018, p. 6). 
The code59 set up the ground recommendations for various matters such as 
risk management, financial statements and accounting and, more importantly, 
for our study, remuneration. The principle regarding CEO compensation states 
that remuneration policy, for managing board, should be such that allows it the 
                                                 
57 From here forward, IPCG 
58 Based on the Corporate Governance report model provided by the IPCG disclosures regarding compensation 
are done in section IV.  
59 Note that the code has two main stages: principles and recommendations. The principles aim to “(…) establish 
a foundation for interpretation and application of the recommendations, but also to offer a qualitatively relevant 
foundation for explaining (…)” (“IPCG - Instituto Português de Corporate Governance” 2018, p. 7). 
  
company to hire qualified experts and that aligns the manager interests with the 
company shareholders interests. Recommendations suggest a compensation 
committee that, at the start of each term, should settle compensation. It also refers 
the Law nº28/2009 from June 19th, forcing companies to disclose their 
remuneration policy.  
This regulatory framework will be used in this thesis. Despite the fact that in 
the period of analysis there are three regulation documents, they do not differ in 
a material way. For this reason, the same compliance requirements will be 
applied. The requirement of disclosure regarding compensation can be verified 
in section D, point IV Remuneration Disclosure of the Corporate Governance 
Code.  
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Chapter 3: Hypotheses Development 
When addressing the level, and what does determine CEO compensation the 
first thing that comes up is company performance. It is a widely sutied topic with 
a rather logic outcome: the variable component of CEO compensation is usually 
tied up to performance indicators. Also, as CEO is the ultimate responsible for 
decisions such as financing, investment and operations (Core & Guay, 2010), he 
will be accountable for how well, or not so well, the company is doing. Then it is 
expected that compensation is positively related to performance. Following 
Chalmers et al. (2006)as well as Core et al. (1999), Ramaswamy et al. (2000) and 
Khanna (2016), the proxy that will be used as to value company performance is 
ROA, that, as stated by Mehran (1995), is a good way to measure performance. 
Company size is another one of the most wide spread compensation 
determinant60 in academic research. The size might have an influence in the level 
of compensation as managing a larger company is not the same as a minor one. 
The complexity behind grand operational and human structures comes with a 
much harder CEO role. This way it is expected that the larger the company, the 
higher the CEO level of compensation will be. Taking into account O’Reilly III et 
al.(1988) and Khanna (2016) sales is the proxy that will be used as to taking the 
company dimension in the model. This measure is also consistent with the 
European Commission recomendation (2003) as how to measure and qualify firm 
size.  
                                                 
60 Along with company performance  
  
CEO specific features, such as tenure, also influence compensation. This 
hypotheses is addressed as number of years as CEO in the same company. One 
would expect that the longer the executive is CEO in a company the higher would 
be the level of compensation. This would happen because of relationship 
development between CEO and co-workers, because of CEO empowerment and 
because of inside informantion, knowledge and expertise that the CEO had built 
over his time in that company. As done by Monti-Belkaoui and Riahi-Belkaoui 
(1993), as well as O'Reilly III et al. (1988) and Fisher and Govindarajan (1992), this 
measure will be stated as the number of years that the CEO have been in the 
company.  
Family ownership is another variable that is addressed as an executive 
compensation determinant. In family companies the tendency is that CEO 
compensation is lower due to reinvestment issues and job security reasons. 
Adittionally, family owned business tendentially presents a family member as 
CEO. This family “handcuff”, comes along with some benefits but also with some 
disadvantages. As being part of the family, CEO may be given the chance to play 
that part in the company, chance he could not have if in the labour market. By 
not being a part in labour market, family CEOs will also accept lower income as 
a trade for job security. It is then expected that family in owned companies, 
compensation will be lower. To assess this determinant it will be evaluated if the 
blockholder controls the company61, and if the blockholder is a family company 
or a family, or group of family members, following Amit and Villalonga (2006) 
and Anderson and Reeb (2003). It was established a family ownership dummy, 
being one when companies comply with the requirements of being a family 
company, and zero otherwise. 
                                                 
61 If the blockholder holds more than 50% of the company and its vote rights.  
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Blockholder is a variable defined within the ownership structure and 
management of the company. The assumption is that a large blockholder have 
more power within the Board and so, is more capable of influencing Board 
decisions. Literature refered that companies in which the blockholder holds more 
than 5% tipically presented lower levels of CEO compensation. Therefore, the 
expectation is that the higher the blockholder holds, the lower the compensation 
will be, since larger blockholders tend to supervise and control more, as well as 
tie compensation with performance. Following Core et al. (1999), Khan et al. 
(2005), Bebchuk and Fried (2004) and Shleifer and Vishny (1997) this variable will 
be addressed as the percentage holded by the blockholder.  
The variable addressed in this thesis as to account for board structure, and its 
impact in CEO compensation, is the weight of the independent members in the 
total of members. Literature stated that independent Boards would have 
unbiased judgement and so would be more capable of fairly evaluate CEO 
performance. As mentioned before, variable compensation is, most of the times, 
indexed to performance indicators and Boards could even, undirectly, impact 
compensation as the decidion of who composes compensation committees is 
theirs. If Board members were not independent, compensation could arise even 
if the CEO did not show any results. The expectation is that the more 
independent the Board is, the lower the compensation would be. Supported by 
Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2009), but also Bebchuk and Fried (2004) and Zahra 
and Pearce (1989), that used the number of independent members, the variable 
will be defined as the percentage of the independent members in the whole 
Board. This way it will not only be accounting for the independent dimension of 
the Board, but also for the size dimension. It is important to outline that literature 
also stated that the larger the boards, the lower the compensation tends to be 
since it is difficult to reach concensus, which tends to strengthen managerial 
power (van Essen et al., 2015). 
  
Along side with compensation settlement process, compensation consultants 
arise. Regarding compensation consultants, it must be clarified that, in Portugual, 
compensation is usually settled by a compensation committee. This committee is 
composed by several members who can be, or not, affiliated with the company. 
These members are hired to advise, propose and settle statutory bodies 
compensation. In this context, these members play the same roles as the 
compensation consultants, described in literature. With a simplified purpose, it 
is assumed that compensation consultants are equivalent to compensation 
committee members. For this reason, the assumption made for the compensation 
consultants apply, in the same way, to compensation committee members.  
Literature states that companies that employ compensation consultants tend to 
present higher levels of executive compensation. Additionally, literature 
suggests that companies that employ more than two consultants present higher 
levels of executive compensation. Following Kabir and Minhat (2014) this thesis 
will take an approach on the dimension of the compensation committee defining 
the variable as number of compensation consultants. It must not be forgotten the 
independence of compensation consultants as it takes part in corporate 
governance good practices. Independent consultants do not provide other 
services or do not have any type of affiliation with Board members and CEO. In 
this context, companies that employ these consultants are expected to present 
lower levels of biase compensation judgement, as they do not incur in “other 
services” or “repeated business”. As to address this, and similarly to the board 
structure, it has been taken the Conyon et al. (2019), as well as Murphy and 
Sandino (2010), Conyon et al. (2009) and Cadman et al.(2010), independent 
consultants approach. However, it was taken in a different angle, accounting for 
the percentage of the independent consultants in the total number of consultants 
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of the compensation committee. The expectation is that the larger the number of 
independent consultants, the lower the compensation tends to be.  
It is expected that when the CEO and the Chairman are within the same 
individual compensation would be higher. Chairman role is one of great 
importance within the Board, which ultimately represents CEO empowerment 
by the Board side. Also, it means that the Board works with a diminished 
evaluation capability and control over the CEO. Even if compensation is settled 
by a Compensation Committee, as is the Board that appoint the committee, CEO 
would have a direct influence over his compensation. As defined by Dorata and 
Petra (2008), Boyd (1994), Agrawal et al. (1991) and also Khanna (2016), CEO 
duality is measured by a dummy variable that is one when duality is present, 
and zero otherwise. 
TSR, mostly used in literature as a performance measure, takes part in this 
thesis as a variable. As TSR accounts, not only for company performance, but also 
for economic profit, it is faced as the return that shareholders take from the 
company. It is then logical to assume that the greater the TSR, the higher the CEO 
compensation tends to be. This might happen as the shareholders want the CEO 
to pursue their company purposes, and when they do so, they might be 
reawarded with higher levels of compensation. As done by Gregory-Smith et al. 
(2014), Canarella and Nourayi (2008), and Buck et al. (2008), the impact of TSR 
financial measure in executive compensation will bw addressed in this thesis . 
Lastly, the latter hypotheses defined in this thesis accounts for the economic 
sector in which the companies are. Literature states that economic sector might 
have an impact in compensation regarding, for example, collusion between firms 
that establish certain levels of compensation, within a sector. Also, the effect of 
sector in compensation can be due to investment trends. This variable is defined 
as a dummy for each selected sector. Following Ramaswamy et al. (2000), 
Chourou et al. (2008), Smith and Watts (1992), and Demsetz and Lehn (1985), that 
  
defined dummy variables for various sectors, in each case, if the company takes 
part in that sector dummy will be 1, if not, it will be zero.  
Table 1 represents the hypotheses taken in this thesis. Please note that this 
thesis will not account for all the potential determina ts of CEO compensation 
that were reffered in the literature review. Variables that define age or key human 
capital variables, for example were not taken into account. The reason behind this 
was not only lack of time to deepen the understanding behind this variables, but 
also the absence of trustworthy information in some cases.  
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Table 1: Hypotheses Development 
Variable Hypotheses Measure 
Expected 
Signal 
References 
Performance 
High company performance shows great CEO decisions and 
management. So highe performances tend to be reawarded with 
higher levels of compensation 
ROA (+) 
Chalmers et al. (2006) 
Ramaswamy et al. (2000) 
Size 
Company dimension influence the level of commitement and 
effort that CEOs have to put into their job, as larger companies 
tend to come with more complex structures 
Sales (+) O’Reilly III et al.(1988) 
Tenure 
Time in a position within a company comes with better 
information, better understanding and greater knowledge of the 
bodies and company operations 
Years as CEO in 
the company 
(+) 
Fisher and Govindarajan 
(1992) 
Monti-Belkaoui and Riahi-
Belkaoui (1993) 
Ownership 
If companies are family owned, due to family handcuff 
phenomenon, CEOs tendentially have lower earnings as they are 
not part of they labour market and the ownership prefers to 
reinvest profits 
Ownership 
Dummy 
(-) 
Amit and Villalonga (2006) 
Anderson and Reeb (2003) 
Blockholder 
The larger the percentage hold by the blockholder, the larger his 
control towards the CEO, and influence within the board, leading 
to a more accurate pay-for-performance case, with lower 
compensation  
Percentage that 
the blockholder 
holds 
(-) 
Core et al. (1999) 
Bebchuk and Fried (2004) 
Independent 
Board Ratio 
Idependent Board members tendentially have na unbiased 
judgement about performance and CEO compenation. The higher 
the ratio between independent members and total members, the 
lower the compensation tends to be 
Nº of 
independent 
members / Nº of 
total members 
(-) 
Chhaochharia and 
Grinstein (2009) 
Zahra and Pearce (1989) 
Consultants 
Companies that hire compensation consultants have a way to 
justify compensation levels, and so will present higher levels of 
CEO compensation. 
Number of 
compensation 
consultants 
(+) Kabir and Minhat (2014) 
  
  
Table 1 (cont): Hypotheses Development 
Variable Hypotheses Measure Expected 
Signal 
References 
Independent 
Consultants 
Ratio 
Idependent consultants, not providing other services, or 
associated with members in the company, do not, tendentially, 
advise higher levels of compensation since there is no conflicts of 
interest. The higher the ratio between independent and total 
consultants, the lower the compensation tends to be 
Nº of 
independent 
members / Nº of 
total members 
(-) 
Murphy & Sandino (2010) 
Conyon et al. (2009) 
Duality 
When the role of Chairman and CEO lays within the same 
individual, Board becomes biased and the individual empowered. 
When there is duality, companies will present higher levels of 
compensation 
Duality Dummy (+) 
Dorata and Petra (2008) 
Khanna (2016) 
TSR 
TSR is as a measure of the shareholders earnings through 
company performance. Tendentially, the higher the shareholders 
returns of their investment in the company, the higher the positive 
impact in compensation will be 
TSR (+) 
Gregory-Smith et al. (2014) 
Buck et al. (2008) 
Economic 
Sector 
Economic sectors can help determine compensation in cases of 
sector investment trends, sector treaties and collusion. The impact 
of economic sector in the determination of CEO compensation is 
unforseen  
Sector Dummy n.a. 
Chourou et al. (2008) 
Ramaswamy et al. (2000) 
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Chapter 4: Data and Method 
4.1. Data 
The data collection was done considering the regulatory framework presented 
earlier: companies should comply, adopt and disclose a corporate governance 
report, and according to the European Transparency Directive (European 
Parliament, 2013), the disclosure obligation of periodic information for investors. 
For this reason data colletion was mainly done through the Corporate 
Governance Reports.  
Corporate Governance Reports were a crucial tool to understand several 
matters, such as the level of compensation of each CEO, Board structure and 
composition, Remuneration Committee structure and composition, duality, 
tenure and ownership. For other informations such as sales or ROA, proxies for 
size and performance respectively, data was retrieved from the audited 
consolidated Annual Financial Reports.  
It is important to outline that, despite the compensation disclosure obligation 
had effects from 2011 onwards, several companies were already disclosing 
compensation amounts in previous fiscal years. This thesis however does not use 
previous information, since, as mentioned, most of the information is retrieved 
from the Corporate Governance reports. This means that the reports must 
present several information, which only took part of the requirements with the 
development of the CMVM regulations. In this context, the reason behind the 
year of 2011 lays in the regulatory framework, as the reports became more 
  
complete, allowing the availability of necessary information to perform proposed 
analysis. 
Information used to calculate TSR was got using Euronext Lisbon historical 
data of shares behaviour for each company. Lastly, it was used the data base SABI 
as a way to understand if the companies were family owned or professionally 
owned. This way, the accuracy of the information was able to be maintained. 
The sample of this thesis consists in Portuguese Stocked companies – Euronext 
Lisbon. The initial sample was composed by 54 companies. However, due to lack 
of information issues, several companies were dropped out leaving the final 
sample with 37 companies. These companies were excluded from the sample as 
they did not present Corporate Governance Reports for the years in analysis, and 
so, did not had reliable information that was crucial to develop this study, such 
as CEO compensation. This means that only the companies that provided 
Corporate Governance Reports were included in this study.  
This is where the study takes different but complementary paths. It were taken 
two approachs: a cross-section analysis considering all the listed stock 
companies, and a panel analysis considering the PSI 20 listed companies. In the 
first one, the fiscal year of 2017 was studied as it was the most recent fiscal year 
with available information for all the companies. For the second case the period 
of study were the fiscal years of 2011, 2014 and 2017. 
The main aim of this study is to evaluate what are the features that may 
influence and determine the level of compensation that CEOs receive. This means 
that the study looks for the determines that could bring up or bring down, that 
can increase or decrease the compensation of a certain CEO giving the conditions 
he faces in the company and his own personal features.  
It is known that compensation is mainly composed by a fixed and a variable 
part. Agency theory suggests that this latter one is the one that match up the 
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company performance and the shareholders interests, maximizing the company 
value. This means that if companies are successful at shareholders eyes they will 
award the CEO through the variable part of compensation. In this study, the 
compensation is faced as whole, meaning that the distinction between variable 
and fixed component is not accounted for.  
Compensation was obtained through the annual Corporate Governance 
Reports disclosed by the companies. For each company, a rigorous and detailed 
search was performed in order to find the real value of the compensation, in a 
given year. Apart from the fixed compensation, it was added all the variable 
ammounts of compensation that the CEO gained the right of, in that same year. 
It has also came across the fact that most of the listed companies were equity 
management companies. 62 This means that CEOs not only receive compensation 
from the designated company, but also from the other group companies. For this 
reason, data was collected focusing not only in the CEO total compensation 
(including all the group compensation), but also in an individual way, so that it 
is possible to assess the differences. This compensation data was collected for the 
fiscal years of 2011, 2014 and 2017.  
Tenure was also collected from the Corporate Governance Reports. So as 
duality, blockholder, Board structure, the number of consultants of the 
Remuneraction Committee, and committee structure. All this variables were 
collected for the same years mentioned above. As for tenure, after identifying the 
CEO, the fiscal year of the first nomination as CEO was looked for, and then, how 
many years had gone by. At the same time, duality was understandable through 
the composition of the various social entitites: if the president of the Executive 
Commission would be the same person as the president of the Board of Directors, 
CEO and Chairman respectively. It is important to notice that some companies 
                                                 
62 From here Forward SGPS – Sociedade Gestora de Participações Sociais.  
  
do not have an Executive Commission, meaning that executive power is 
concentrated in the Board of Directors hands.  
The percentage hold by the largest shareholder, indirectly or directly was also 
contained in the report, as the company discloses the largest shareholders and 
the direct or indirect imputation of the equity capital and voting rights. It is 
important to outline that when addressing the blockholder the purpose is to asses 
the level of power and control. This way, the percentage that was collected for 
this study was the voting rights percentage, opposing to the equity capital one.  
As to the structure of both the Board and the Remuneration Committee, the 
data was collected taking into account the number of members, and the number 
of independent members of both entities. In both cases, the independence criteria 
was the one proposed by CMVM, that companies may use to define wether their 
social body members are independent or not.  
The ammounts of sales, assets, net income, or dividends were collected 
through the Annual Financial Reports, audited consolidated accounts. These 
ammounts were important to define company size, performance and TSR. These 
data was collected for the fiscal years of 2011, 2014 and 2017.  
To obtain TSR value for each company, it was also necessary to resort to the 
Euronext Lisbon historical data, as it was needed the initial market stock value 
of the shares for the year, and the ending market stock value for the year. Since 
historical data did not comprised all the companies for all the years of the 
proposed panel analysis, it was decided that TSR would only be included in the 
cross-sectional analysis, meaning that data was collected for the fiscal year of 
2017.  
Lastly, Sabi data base was crucial to obtain ownership information. For each 
company, it was evaluated the property data: if the blockholder would have less 
than the majority of voting rights, directly or indirectly, it was considered not 
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family owned. If the blockholder percentage was superior to fifty percent, 
meaning that there was clear control in that company, it would be assess who the 
blockholder was or who controls the company that acts like the blockholder. For 
all the companies behind that first blockholder we looked for control63 until we 
reached to the bottom person (or company) of that line to verify if it was part of 
the family that developed and holds the company.  
Please note that to address the company sector it has been taken into account 
the description of the company and business that figures in the first part of the 
Annual Financial Report. Summing up, the collected items, for the years of 2017, 
2014 and 2011, for this thesis were: (1) name of the CEO, (2) name of the 
Chairman; (3) total CEO compensation, (4) individual CEO compensation, (5) 
existence of Duality, (6) Ownership, (7) number of Board members, (8) number 
of independent Board members, (9) number of Remuneration Committee 
members, (10) number of independent Remuneration Committee members, (11) 
percentage hold from the blockholder, (12) years as CEO, (13) total assets, (14) 
net income, (15) sales, (16) initial stock market share value, (17) ending stock 
market share value and (18) dividend per share, (19) economic sector.64  
4.2. Dependent and Independent Variables 
As mentioned before, this thesis aim to explain what determines the level of 
compensation that CEOs receive. In an attempt to explain what and how it 
influences executive compensation two models were defined. These two models 
account for different time frames and companies. Apart from that, both models 
have the same purpose, one accounting for the temporal effect, and the other 
holding a larger sample of companies, with the latest financial information 
avilable.  
                                                 
63 Voting rights, directly or indirectly, superior to 50%. 
64 Number (16), (17) and (18) were only collected for the cross-sectional model, meaning for the year of 2017, as 
historical data was not available for all the companies in all the years so that it could make it into panel model.  
  
For both models compensation was defined as the dependent variable, the one 
that is trying to be explained, through other variables, the independent ones. 
Therefore, the attempt is to verifiy which of the independent variables help 
explaining the compensation of CEOs  
One of the independent variables defined in both models is performance, and 
the proxy suggested by literature to address performance is ROA Measured by 
the ratio between net income and total assets of the company, ROA is calculated 
as illustrated in Equation 1. 
 
 𝑅𝑂𝐴 =
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
  Equation 1 
 
ROA is presumed to be a good proxy for performance as it is understanded 
that accounting returns are important when determining executive 
compensation, as these earnings provide information to the board regarding the 
value added to the firm by the CEO. With performance influencing compensation 
decisions, CEOs have the incentive to make decisions, or report income, in ways 
that it will affect ROA and consequently, compensation. (Mehran, 1995) 
Another explainable variable is size, proxied by sales. The value of sales was 
obtained through the consolidated financial statement of each company. Tenure, 
number of years as a CEO in a given company, is also an independent variable 
that might explain different levels of compensation. As to obtain tenure, it was 
taken into account the fiscal year in which the individual started functions as 
CEO, and the fiscal year that it is being analysed. To compute the number of years 
that a person has been CEO we followed Equation 2.  
 
𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒 = 𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝐹𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 − 𝐹𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑏𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑠 𝐶𝐸𝑂 + 1 Equation 2 
 
As mentioned before, the independent variable blockholder was retrieved 
from the Corporate Governance Report as the person or company who holds the 
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highest stake in the company, directly or indirectly. The same thing has been 
done to Board structure, and Remuneration Committee composition and 
structure, explainable variables. For all of them the number of members and their 
specificity65 were retrieved from the report. Please note that when it comes to 
Board members they are divided into three categories: 
a) Executive members - the ones who have management functions; 
b) Non-executive Non-independent members - the ones that do not have 
management functions; 
c) Non-executive Independent members - the ones that do not have 
management functions, do not have links to the company and do not 
receive compensation conditioned upon company performance. 
The ones that are taken into account for this study are the latter ones, Non-
executive Independent members.  
In the same line, compensation consultants are divided in dependent and 
independent ones. That division is made in the report and according to CMVM 
definition of independency. For both structure variables,  shows how the ratio 
was calculated.  
 
 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 =
𝑛º 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑠
𝑛º 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑠
 Equation 3 
 
TSR migt also explain compensation. To compute TSR it was used the 
historical Euronext Lisbon data to obtain the initial and ending stock market 
share value. The dividend per share was taken out of the Annual Financial 
Report. TSR was computed as shown in Equation 4. 
 
𝑇𝑆𝑅 =
(𝐸𝑀𝑆𝑉−𝐼𝑀𝑆𝑉+𝐷𝑖𝑣)
𝐼𝑀𝑆𝑉
 Equation 4 
 
Where: 
EMSV – Ending Market Share Value;     IMSV – Initial Market Share Value;       Div – Dividend. 
                                                 
65 Independent or not independente. 
  
 
The rest of the explainable variables are dummy variables. Ownership, 
duality, and sector were all defined as dummies. Ownership was defined as 1 if 
the company is family owned, and 0 otherwise. Duality was defined as 1 if the 
CEO and Chariman are the same person, 0 otherwise. Similarly, there were 
defined several sector dummies, such as industry or sevices, and each one of 
them was 1 if the company is comprehended in that sector, 0 otherwise. 
 
4.3. Methodology  
The hypotheses established in Table 1 of this chapter were used to define two 
complementary analysis. In the first one, the hypotheses were tested, throught 
multiple individuals, for the fiscal year of 2017, making a cross-sectional analysis. 
In the cross-section analysis compensation is a function of: company 
performance, company size, tenure, ownership, blockholder, Board structure, 
compensation consultants, Remuneration Committee structure, duality, TSR and 
company sector. 
In the second one, panel analysis, the hypotheses established earlier, in Table 
1Table 2, were tested. This time accounting for several individuals over a 
multiple period of time. For the fiscal years of 2011, 2014 and 2017, the 
relationship established, for the panel analysis, between the dependent and 
independent variables, was the following: compensation is a function of 
company performance, company size, tenure, ownership, Board structure, 
compensation consultants, Remuneration Committee structure, duality and 
economic sector.  
As discussed earlier, the panel analysis will not account for the explanatory 
variable TSR. The data base used to retrieve the initial market share value and 
the ending market share value, did not have information for all the companies, 
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in all the accounted years. For this reason, the variable was excluded from panel 
analysis. The company sector dummies have also been adapted to fit in this 
model. As the sample for panel analysis only contains 17 individuals, companies 
had to be reallocated into other groups to avoid dummies with a single 
observation.  
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Chapter 5: Results  
5.1. Sample Characteristics  
In the first stage of this study, both samples, cross-sectional and panel, were 
analysed in a descriptive way. The descriptive statistic gives an interesting data 
and variables overview, as well as a perception of the behaviour of the different 
variables.  
5.1.1. Cross-Sectional Data  
As mentioned before, the cross-section analysis accounted with 37 Portuguese 
stocked companies for the fiscal year of 2017.  
Table 2 shows the distribution of those 37 companies regarding their 
economic sector. We can conclude that the sample is mainly composed by 
companies within the services sector. Around 32% of sample play in the services 
sector, followed by industry (24%) and technology (14%). The sectors that show 
least presence in this sample are sports and telecomunications (5%). 
 
  
  
Table 2: Distribution of the Companies by Sector – Cross-sectional Variables 
 Nº Observations Percentage  
Construction 3 8% 
Energy 4 11% 
Industry 9 24% 
Services 12 32% 
Technology 5 14% 
Telecomunications 2 5% 
Sports 2 5% 
Total 37 100% 
 
Accounting for ownership, Table 3 informs that around 35% of the sample 
companies are family owned, making 65% of them non-family owned. This 
allows the conclusion that non-family companies compose the majority of the 
sample. 
 
Table 3: Distribution of the Companies by Ownership – Cross-sectional Variables 
  Nº Observations Percentage 
Family Owned 13 35% 
Non-family Owned 24 65% 
Total 37 100% 
  
 
 
Similarly, Table 4 allows the understanding that most companies of this 
sample face a duality situation (68% of the sample), since only 32% of them have 
the power of CEO and Chairman in separated hands. This means that, for the 
most, Portuguese companies face a centralized power condition. 
 
Table 4: Distribution of the Companies by Existence of Duality – Cross-sectional Variables 
  Nº Observations Percentage  
Duality 25 68% 
Non-duality 12 32% 
Total 37 100% 
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Another analysis done was the comparison between the total number of Board 
members and the number of independent Board members. Figure 3 shows both 
of these variables. It is notable that several companies do not have any 
independent Bord member (such as Altri, Corticeira Amorim, Glintt or VAA, as 
an example). The fact that 19 companies do not present any independent member 
can lead to situations where CEO compensation is higher due to a biased Board. 
The combination of this with the Portuguese duality situation, shown in Table 4, 
can lead to excessive levels of compensation, as several companies present 
duality and have all Board members are not independent. Examples of this are 
Altri, Benfica SAD, Corticeira Amorim, EDP and Ibersol, amongst others.  
 
 
Figure 3: Board Members – Cross-sectional Variables 
 
In the same line, compensation consultants were analysed, regarding the total 
number of compensation consultants when comparing to the independent 
consultants. Figure 4 illustrates that most companies present three compensation 
consultants, and in most of them the three elements are independent. However, 
  
we might point out cases like Corticeira Amorim, NOS or Toyota Caetano, as 
examples, which do not present any independent members. The most peculiar 
case is Grão Pára, that do not present any consultant at all. The fact is that this 
company did not pay compensation in the fiscal year of 2017 because of the 
complicated financial situation in which the company is in. For this reason it was 
not necessary to have a Compensation Committee. Considering the 37 
companies, most of them present a reasonable independent to total member ratio, 
meaning that these companies account for the independency recommendations, 
when it comes to compensation consultants 
 
 
Figure 4: Number of Compensation Consultants – Cross-sectional Variables 
 
When analysing the Corporate Governance Report it was perceptible, the 
compensation stratification according to the companies that pay that 
compensation to the CEO. As group compensation, it is meant compensation as 
whole, paid for all the companies composing the groups. As individual 
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compensation it is meant compensation paid by the holding company66 on its 
own. Figure 5 shows those differences. It is interesting that some CEOs receive 
their whole compensation from subsidiary companies (as individual 
compensation is non-existing), such as EDP R, Ramada or Reditus.  
Several companies present group compensation equal to individual 
compensation meaning that the total compensation is received from the SGPS. 
However, five companies present other situation67: group compensation is higer 
than the individual compensation, meaning that part of the compensation is 
received from subsidiaries. The most outrageous example is Semapa, followed 
by Jerónimo Martins , in which the CEOs receive more than 2 and 1 million euros, 
respectively, only from subsidiaries. This mesn that when reading news, 
attention must be paid to the type of compensation newspaper are accounting 
for. 
 
 
Figure 5: Group and Individual Compensation – Cross-sectional Variables 
                                                 
66 From here forward, SGPS. 
67 J. Martins, Navigator, Semapa, Sonae Com, Sonae SGPS.  
  
 
Table 5 presents the maximum and minimum values of the cross-section 
variables. We can verify that between maximum values and minimum values, 
variables present a pronounced gap. The maximum compensation values are 
both from Semapa and the minimum values are both from Sonae Indústria. The 
maximum value for tenure states for the CEO of Grão Pára, 50 years, explained 
by the family ownership of the company. The same company shows a TSR 
maximum value that is far from any other company. This happened because of 
the gap between the initial and the ending market share value, and the non-
existent dividends. A comparison between independent Board members and 
compensation consultants can also be made. There are situations in which the 
compensation committees are fully independent, hence why the maximum being 
1. However, in the Board this does not happen, being the maximum value 78% 
of independent members.  
 
Table 5: Maximum and Minimum – Cross-sectional Variables 
 Maximum Minimum 
Group Compensation (€) 4746579,36 51800,00 
Ind. Compensation (€) 2288274,00 51800,00 
ROA (%) 18,05% -299,69% 
Sales (€) 16276150000,00 30000,00 
Tenure (Years) 50,00 2,00 
Blockholder (%) 94,64% 10,00% 
Independent Board Ratio 0,78 0,00 
Consultants (nº) 6,00 0,00 
Independent Consultants Ratio 1,00 0,00 
TSR (%) 2400,00% -50,00% 
 
Table 6 refers to the mean and the median of the cross-sectional variables. It 
can be verified that the group compensation median lays in the 411.000 euros 
mark, and sales in the 133.235.277 mark. Whenaccounting for the individual 
compensation the median is higher, in the 439.550 euros mark. This happens 
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because individual compensation is usually lower, and differs less across 
companies, when comparing to group compensation. The median ROA is 3%, 
meaning that for each euro invested in assets the company will generate 3 cents 
in earnings. The TSR represents in the median an earning of 29 cents per share. 
 
Table 6: Mean and Median – Cross-sectional Variables 
 Mean Median 
Group Compensation (€) 799976,34 411000,00 
Ind. Compensation (€) 620933,34 439550,00 
ROA (%) -5,39% 2,81% 
Sales (€) 875369254,00 133235277,00 
Tenure (Years) 11,65 9,00 
Blockholder (%) 50,97% 52,15% 
Independent Board Ratio 0,21 0,06 
Consultants (nº) 3,00 3,00 
Independent Consultants Ratio 0,61 1,00 
TSR (%) 98,81% 28,89% 
 
  
  
5.1.2. Panel Data  
The panel analysis incorporated 17 companies that take part in the PSI 20 
Index through the fiscal years of 2011, 2014 and 2017. 
In panel data there are some variables that remain still across time. Economic 
sector is one of them. As shown in Table 7, the majority of the sample lays in the 
service sector (35%), followed by energy and industry that represent 24% of the 
sample each. The sector that is the least reprensenteted in this sample is 
techonology and telecommunication (18%). 
 
Table 7: Distribution of Companies by Sector – Panel Variables 
  Nº Observations Percentage  
Energy 4 24% 
Industriy 4 24% 
Services 6 35% 
Technology and Telecomunication 3 18% 
Total 17 100% 
 
Ownership is another variable that do not diverge across time. Table 8 allows 
the conclusion that ownership remains still. The majority of the companies are 
non-family owned (65%), meaning that their shares remain in free float, or with 
small blockholders that do not own control and that do not represent a family.  
 
Table 8: Distribution of Companies by Ownership – Panel Variables 
 2017 2014 2011 
  Number %  Number %  Number  %  
Family owned 6 35% 6 35% 6 35% 
Non-family owned  11 65% 11 65% 11 65% 
Total 17 100% 17 100% 17 100% 
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When it comes to the separation of powers between CEO and Chairman, Table 
9 allows an overview of the Portuguese PSI 20 companies. Between 2011 and 2014 
the number of companies incurring in duality did no change. However, from 
2014 to 2017 the number of companies that incurred in duality situations 
increased 12 percentual points. This means that in 2017, PSI 20 had more 
companies in which the CEO and Chairman role are within the same individual. 
this may have a positive influence in the level of compensation to 2014 to 2017.  
 
Table 9: Distribution of Companies by Existence of Duality – Panel Variables 
 2017 2014 2011 
  Number %  Number %  Number  %  
Duality 10 59% 8 47% 8 47% 
No Duality 7 41% 9 53% 9 53% 
Total 17 100% 17 100% 17 100% 
 
Figure 6 adresses the evolution of CEO compensation throughout the years at 
an individual and group level. It is verifiable that, when comparing 2011 to 2017, 
compensation level has increased. However, there is a decrease after 2011 shown 
in 2014 values. Despite the conclusion reached by Real (2018), that overall the 
crisis period is not significant and does not have an impact in compensation, the 
author pointed out an impact, when considering the compensation as the natural 
logarithm of compensation. As so, the decrease in compensation shown in 2014 
can be explained as consequence of the crisis period (2008-2013) lived in Portugal. 
As mentioned before, in 2011, companies had to start disclosing compensation 
paid to their statutory boards. Figure 6, once again, shows that compensation 
droped from 2011 to 2014, which may suggest that companies that did not 
comply with Corporate Governance Code requirements, presented lower 
compensation values (Chhaochharia & Grinstein, 2009). This lack of compliance 
could be due to independency issues, for example.  
  
 
Figure 6: Group and Individual Compensation according to the median – Panel Variables 
 
Table 10, Table 11 and Table 12 show the mean and median values for panel 
variables for 2011, 2014 and 2017, respectively. From the joint analysis of the 
tables with Figure 6 it is understandable that across time group compensation, 
as well as individual compensation, had a drop in the year of 2014, when 
comparing to 2011. Nonetheless, in 2017 companies fully recovered, showing 
higher compensation values when comparing to both other years.  
 
Table 10: Mean and Median 2011 – Panel Variables 
2011 Mean Median 
Group Compensation (€) 835282,74 783720,00 
Ind. Compensation (€) 741936,37 636841,67 
ROA (%)  2,68% 2,02% 
Sales (€)  1198468121,82 472337405,00 
Tenure (Years) 6,82 5,00 
Blockholder (%) 42,78% 48,89% 
Independent Board Ratio 0,19 0,18 
Consultants (nº) 3,18 3,00 
Independent Consultants Ratio   0,59         0,67 
  
79 
 
Table 11: Mean and Median 2014 – Panel Variables 
2014 Mean     Median 
Group Compensation (€) 893632,32   744000,00 
Ind. Compensation (€)      737076,80 584277,00 
ROA (%)  1,13% 2,54% 
Sales (€)  769796752,94 203829618,00 
Tenure (Years) 6,71 3,00 
Blockholder (%) 45,54% 50,01% 
Independent Board Ratio 0,23 0,20 
Consultants (nº) 3,06 3,00 
Independent Consultants Ratio   0,69        1,00 
 
Table 12: Mean and Median 2017 – Panel Variables  
2017 Mean Median 
Group Compensation (€) 1239875,82 891043,00 
Ind. Compensation (€) 938717,74 837647,00 
ROA (%)  -13,91% 3,43% 
Sales (€)  763250488,31 158439382,50 
Tenure (Years) 9,06 6,00 
Blockholder (%) 43,89% 51,00% 
Independent Board Ratio 0,25 0,26 
Consultants (nº) 3,29 3,00 
Independent Consultants Ratio 0,66 1,00 
 
Figure 7 adresses the independency case, in both the board members and 
compensation consultants. It is visible that the percentage of independent 
compensation consultants through the years is higher when comparing to board 
members. With the help of Table 10, Table 11 and Table 12, it is unerstandable 
that compensation consultants are in less number when comparing to Board 
members. Despite the fact that, tendentially, boards have more members; it is just 
the proportion of independent members to total members that is minor. It is also 
verifiable that across time the percentage of independent persons in company 
social bodies is continuously increasing. This ultimately means that companies 
are compromised, and understand, the importance of having independent 
indiduals in their social bodies. 
 
  
 
Figure 7: Percentage of independent members according to the median – Panel Variables 
 
According to Figure 8, ROA show an increase over time, meaning that 
company performance have been imporving. On the opposite side, Figure 9 
shows a clear decrease in the sales level of the companies. This might be due to 
the financial crisis that Portugal in the peiod of 2008 to 2013. However, despite 
the fact that sales have decreased over the analysed years, one may argue that 
companies have built up their efficiency, translated in ROA increase.  
 
 
Figure 8: ROA according to the median – Panel Variables 
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Figure 9: Sales according to the median – Panel Variables 
 
 
 
  
  
5.2. Results 
As mentioned earlier, Table 1 hypotheses were tested by two complementary 
analysis. The first one, based on a cross-section regression and the second on 
panel data regression 
5.2.1. Cross-sectional Results  
Under the Ordinary Least Squares68 approach, a regression with compensation 
as dependent variable, was performed (Equation 5).  
Equation 5 
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽4𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖
+ 𝛽5𝐵𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽6𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖 + 𝛽7𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑖
+ 𝛽8𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖 + 𝛽9𝐷𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 + 𝛽10𝑇𝑆𝑅𝑖
+ 𝛽11𝐷. 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 + 𝛽12𝐷. 𝐸𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑖 + 𝛽13𝐷. 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝛽14𝐷. 𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑖
+ 𝛽15𝐷. 𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑛𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑦𝑖 + 𝛽16𝐷. 𝑇𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽17𝐷. 𝑆𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑖 + 𝜇 𝑖   
 
After first trying to estimate by OLS, a Breusch-Pagan test revealed that 
errors were not homocedastic (test statistic= 49,077440; p-value= 0,000032). 
Therefore, the model was reestimated by Weighted Least Squares69, using 
Equation 6 as wheights. 
 
𝑊𝑖 =  
1
𝑉(𝑢𝑖)
=  
1
exp (𝑙?̂? 𝑒𝑖
2)
   Equation 6 
 
 
Where 𝑒𝑖
2 are the residuals of the OLS regression and 𝑙𝑛 ̂𝑒𝑖
2 is obtained from 
the auxiliary regression showed in Equation 7 
Equation 7 
ln 𝑒𝑖
2 = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖 + 𝛾2𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖 + 𝛾3𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖 + 𝛾4𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖 + 𝛾5𝐵𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖
+ 𝛾6𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖 + 𝛾7𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑖
+ 𝛾8𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖 + 𝛾9𝐷𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 + 𝛾10𝑇𝑆𝑅𝑖
+ 𝛾11𝐷. 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 + 𝛾12𝐷. 𝐸𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑖 + 𝛾13𝐷. 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝛾14𝐷. 𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑖
+ 𝛾15𝐷. 𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑛𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑦𝑖 + 𝛾16𝐷. 𝑇𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖 + 𝛾17𝐷. 𝑆𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
 
                                                 
68 From here forward, OLS. 
69 From here forward, WLS. 
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Where 𝜇𝑖 are assumed to be the independent random disturbances. 
Through the WLS estimation the results obtained were the ones present in 
Table 13. 
 
Table 13: Regression Results – Cross-sectional Variables 
 Coefficient 
const  
-907 911 
(805 853) 
ROA 
260 396    * significant at 10% 
(130 187) 
Sales 
0,00011    ** significant at 5% 
(4,71E-05) 
Tenure 
41 340    * significant at 10% 
(21 485) 
FamilyOwnership 
10 166  
(190 360) 
Blockholder 
2 098  
(269 472) 
Independent Board Ratio 
438 784  
(658 857) 
Consultants 
161 621  
(193 619) 
Independent Consultant Ratio 
227 931  
(188 862) 
Duality 
-339 506 
(214 546) 
TSR  
-47 273 
(42 904) 
DCON 
671 281  
(444 666) 
DENG 
1 424 900    ** significant at 5% 
(619 474) 
DIND 
674 279  
(401 949) 
DSERV 
312 502  
(348 719) 
DTECH  
505 173  
(414 005) 
DTEL 
1 220 700    *** significant at 1% 
(420 779) 
 
  
  
 
These results allow the conclusion that only, the explanatory variables, ROA, 
Sales and Tenure, as well as the sector dummies for Energy and 
Telecomunications, whe comparing Sports sector dummy, are statiscal 
significant. It is important to outline that variables such as ROA or Tenure appear 
as little significant, with only 10% of statistical significance. Sales appear as more 
significant (5% of significance), mening that for each million euro increase in sales 
CEOs tend to receive 110 euros more. 
In the same line of statistical significance is the energy sector meaning tha 
companies included in this sector tend to compensate their CEOs 1.424.900 euros 
more, in comparison to the sports sector. The same thing happens with the 
Telecomunications sector, but with a 1% statiscal significance, meaning that 
CEOs of telecommunication companies tendentially receive 1.220.700 euros more 
than sports companies CEOs. This sector coeficients seem rather large, but it is 
important to keep in mind that sectors are being compared to the sports sector, 
that presents compensation values lower than the median.  
For the variables ROA, Sales and Tenure, the signs showed by the coeficients 
were exactly as expected. The expectation was that, since the CEO is the ultimate 
responsible for the company operational decisions, the greater the performance70 
of the company, the large would be the CEO compensation. This means that as 
stated by Chalmers et al. (2006) and Ramaswamy et al. (2000) CEOs are 
reawarded with larger compensation packages when companies are performing 
well.  
The same thing was expected for size71: the larger the size of the company, the 
higher the compensation would be, since larger companies require rather 
complex management (O'Reilly III et al (1988) and Khanna (2016)). As a complex 
                                                 
70 Proxied by ROA. 
71 Proxied by Sales. 
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structure requires more effort and management ability, companies have to 
compensate CEOs in order to match up the work complexity and their 
managerial talent. 
Lastly, Tenure presents a positive sign, meaning that the longer the CEO have 
ben CEO in the company, the higher the level of compensation will be. These 
results are consistent with Monti-Belkaoui and Riahi-Belkaoui (1993), and Fisher 
and Govindarajan (1992) that argued that tenure allows CEOs to have a better 
understandement of the company and the business, as well as the development 
their reputation amongst their companies. This ultimately means that CEOs are 
capable of making wiser and better informed decisions, that will have a positive 
impact in company performance.  
Regarding the adjustement quality, the R-squared measure, for the original 
model, corresponds to 0,599. This means that around 60% of the observations of 
the dependent variable are explained by the regressors present in the model  
 
5.2.2. Panel Results 
The panel regression was estimated applying Equation 8: 
 
Equation 8 
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝐵𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽8𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐷𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐷. 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽11𝐷. 𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽12𝐷. 𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑛𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑦𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑇𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽13𝐷. 𝐸𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑖𝑡
+ 𝜇𝑖𝑡 
 
Where the 𝜇𝑖𝑡 error term is decomposed as shown in Equation 9: 
 
𝜇𝑖𝑡 = 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡    Equation 9 
 
 
  
Where 𝜇𝑖  is a firm specific effect, 𝜆𝑡  a time effect and 𝜀𝑖𝑡  are independent 
random disturbances.  
The panel regression might be estimated by fixed or random effects. Random 
estimators are usually more efficient but assume that the companies specific 
terms (µ𝑖) are uncorrelated with all he explanatory variables. In order to check 
this assumption it was performed an Hausman test for endogeneity. The 
conclusion was that this assumption was not tenable for this data (test statistic= 
42,9548; p-value= 0,000000896). Therefore we proceeded with a fixed effect 
methodology. 
It is important to outline that the fixed effects approach does not account for 
variables that remain still over time. This means that sector dummies were not 
accounted for, since companies remain in the same economic sector across the 
analysed period. The same thing happened with ownership, as the family owned 
dummy did not have differences across time.  
The panel model comprehended three different time frames, and for this 
reason time dummies were accounted for, in an attempt to assess the effect of 
time in compensation  
The results were the following, presented in Table 14: 
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Table 14: Regression Results – Panel Variables 
 Coefficient 
const  
-619 867 
(637 837) 
ROA 
389 150    ** significant at 5% 
(134 734) 
Sales 
-0,000088 
(8,73E-05) 
Tenure 
80 861    ** significant at 5% 
(37 823) 
Blockholder 
796 788  
(820 626) 
Independent Board Ratio 
831 563  
(867 776) 
Consultants 
168 480    ** significant at 5% 
(66 963) 
Independent Consultant Ratio 
138 094  
(252 223) 
Duality 
-255 344 
(196 239) 
D2014 
-13 359 
(91 379) 
D2011 
192 396  
(135 044 ) 
 
These results suggest that only the variables ROA, Tenure and Consultants are 
significant, with a statistical significance of 5%. Results propose that performance 
is positevly correlated with compensation, as it as expected. For every percentual 
point increase in company performance, measured by ROA, CEOs tend to receive 
389.150 euros more. 
Tenure also have a positive influence in compensation, meaning that the 
longer the CEO has been CEO in the company the higher the compensation will 
be. Tendentially, for each year gone by as a CEO, the compensation will increase 
80.861 euros.  
Lastly, consultants appear as a significant explanatory variable in this analysis. 
The sign of this variable show a positive impact in compensation, meaning that 
consultants positively influence compensation. This means that for any 
additional consultant, CEO compensation will increase in 168.480 euros. This 
  
sign was exctly as expected and consisten with Kabir and Minhat (2014) and 
Conyon et al. (2019). This positive influence might be explained for the 
companies need to obtain a fair and unbiased compensation advice (Conyon et 
al., 2009), that match up CEO compensation and the need to attract and retain 
expert CEOs (Ogden & Watson, 2012). However it can also be consequence of 
company needs to justify higher leves of compensation (Bebchuk & Fried, 2003).  
In fact, the explanatory variables performance and tenure are consistently 
significant in both analysis, cross.section and panel. In this context, it is possible 
to conclude that performance and tenure are, indeed, determinants of CEO 
compensation. Despite the statiscal significance of the explanatory variable size, 
in the cross-section analysis, as well as the sector dummies energy and 
telecomunications, these variables did not show any significance in the panel 
analysis. The same thing happened with the number of compensation 
consultants that each company employ. This variable was significant in the panel 
analysis; however, it was not significant in the cross-section analysis. 
The latter case might be explained because of the temporal dimension given 
by the panel analysis. This dimension includes a larger quantity of information, 
which allows a better and wider perception of the variables. In the consultants 
case, it is possible to understand that, overtime, the fluctuation of the number of 
Remuneration Committee members have a positive impact in compensation. 
Nonetheless being on the opposite direction, the same thing might happen for 
the explanatory variable size. As mentioned before, despite being significant in 
cross-section analysys, size is not significant in panel analysis. The explanation 
might also be in the temporal dimension of the panel analysis. When accounting 
for just one period of time, compensation might be influenced by size. However, 
when accounting for multiple periods, size appear to be not as significant. This 
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might be due to the fact that in the long-term compensation might be tied up to 
performance indicators rather than sales growth.  
In the dummies cases the explanation, for the lack of significance in the panel 
analysis, might lay in variability. Dummy variables have tendentially little 
variability within an individual. However, when the number of individuals 
within a sample increases, the capability to detect the influence of a dummy 
variable increases. For this reason, as the cross-section analysis presented a 
sample with more companies, when comparing to the panel analysis, dummy 
effects are most likely detected in cross-section.  
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Chapter 6: Conclusions and Future Research  
CEO compensation is a mediatic subject in Portugal. How much CEOs earn, 
how it compares to the former year, and how it compares to the average co-
worker of the companies they manage, are the most debated questions.  
This thesis aimed to verify what defines the level, and what are the 
determinants of CEO compensation. Having a sample of 37 Portuguese listed 
companies, two analysis were taken into account. The first one consisted in a 
cross-section analysis, with a sample of 37 companies, for the fiscal year of 2017. 
The second one consisted in a panel analysis, for 17 companies of PSI 20, for the 
fiscal years of 2011, 2014, 2017.  
Both analysis were performed with data retrieved from the companies 
Corporate Governance Reports. These reports settled, from the fiscal year of 2011, 
the disclosure obligation of companies social bodies compensation, in an 
aggregated and individual level. Hence why, the first period of the panel analysis 
is 2011. 
Although CEO compensation showed some evidence to decrease between 
2011 and 2014, and then to increase towards the year of 2017; these variations 
were not found to be statistically significant. 
Another conclusion of this study is that performance and tenure are 
determinants of CEO compensation. Performance has a positive impact in 
compensation, acting as a reaward mechanism. As CEOs are responsible for 
cucial operational decisions, that have a direct impact in companies performance, 
  
when companies do well, CEOs are reawarded with higher levels of 
compensation.  
CEO tenure is also a compensation determinant. This determinant is justified 
by the benefits that CEOs obtain through their longevity within the company. 
The development of relationships with co-workers and key management 
individuals, as well as the development of company insider knowledge, provide 
CEOs with the necessary tools to take wise decisions that will have a positive 
impact in companies performance. 
Company size was a significant variable in the cross-section analysis, and 
compensation consultants, a significant variable, in the panel analysis. These 
variables were not consistently significant in both analysis. One explanation for 
this might lay in the temporal dimension in the panel analysis, and the lack of it 
in the cross-section analysis. This might reveal that the evolution of the number 
of consultants have an impact in compensation, however, for a single time frame 
it is not accounted for. Also, size might be significant for a given year, but when 
accounting for the long-term, company size do not determine compensation.  
Throughout the development of this study  some difficulties were faced, as 
lack of data, which reduced the samples and disabled the inclusion of other 
potentially relevant determinants. In future studies it would be interesting to 
explore the investment in education and the impact of market competitors 
compensation, as determinants. 
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Appendix 
Appendix A – Companies in Cross-section Analysis 
 
Table 15: Companies – Cross-section Analysis 
 Company Name Company Abreviation 
1 ALTRI, SGPS, S.A. ALTRI 
2 Banco Comercial Português, S.A. BCP 
3 Sport Lisboa e Benfica Futebol SAD - S.A. BENFICA SAD 
4 COFINA - SGPS, S.A. COFINA 
5 Compta - Equipamentos e Serviços de Informatica, S.A. COMPTA 
6 Corticeira Amorim, SGPS, S.A. CORTICEIRA AMORIM 
7 CTT - Correios de Portugal, S.A. CTT  
8 EDP - Energias de Portugal, S.A. EDP 
9 EDP Renováveis, S.A. EDP R 
10 ESTORIL SOL, S.G.P.S., S.A. ESTORIL SOL  
11 FUTEBOL CLUBE DO PORTO – FUTEBOL, SAD, S.A. FCP SAD 
12 Galp Energia, SGPS, S.A. GALP 
13 Glintt – Global Intelligence Technologies, S.A. GLINTT 
14 Imobiliária Construtora Grão Pará, S.A. GRAO PARA 
15 IBERSOL – SGPS, S.A. IBERSOL 
16 Impresa - SGPS, S.A. IMPRESA 
17 Inapa - Ivestimentos, Participações e Gestão, S.A. INAPA-INV.P.GESTAO 
18 Jerónimo Martins SGPS, S.A. J.MARTINS 
19 LISGRÁFICA - Impressão e Artes Gráficas, S.A. LISGRAFICA 
20 Martifer SGPS, S.A. MARTIFER 
21 Média Capital, SGPS, S.A. MEDIA CAPITAL 
22 Mota-Engil – SGPS, S.A. MOTA-ENGIL 
23 The Navigator Company S.A. NAVIGATOR 
24 NOS, SGPS, S.A. NOS 
  
  
 
Table 15 (Cont): Companies – Cross-section Analysis 
 Company Name Company Abreviation 
25 Novabase, SGPS, S.A. NOVABASE 
26 Pharol, SGPS, S.A. PHAROL 
27 F. Ramada - Investimentos, S.G.P.S., S.A. RAMADA 
28 REDITUS SGPS, SA REDITUS 
29 REN – Redes Energéticas Nacionais, S.G.P.S., S.A. REN 
30 Semapa - Sociedade de Investimento e Gestão, SGPS, SA SEMAPA 
31 Sonae Capital, SGPS, S.A. SONAE CAPITAL 
32 Sonaecom, S.G.P.S., S.A. SONAECOM 
33 Sonae Indústria, SGPS, S.A. SONAE IND 
34 Sonae - SGPS, S.A SONAE, SGPS 
35 Teixeira Duarte, S.A.  TEIXEIRA DUARTE 
36 Toyota Caetano Portugal, S.A. TOYOTA CAETANO 
37 VAA - Vista Alegre Atlantis, SGPS, SA VAA 
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Appendix B – Companies in Panel Analysis 
 
Table 16: Companies – Panel Analysis 
 Company Name Company Abreviation 
1 ALTRI, SGPS, S.A. ALTRI 
2 Banco Comercial Português, S.A. BCP 
3 Corticeira Amorim, SGPS, S.A. CORTICEIRA AMORIM 
4 CTT - Correios de Portugal, S.A. CTT 
5 EDP - Energias de Portugal, S.A. EDP 
6 EDP Renováveis, S.A. EDP R 
7 Galp Energia, SGPS, S.A. GALP 
8 IBERSOL – SGPS, S.A. IBERSOL 
9 Mota-Engil – SGPS, S.A. MOTA-ENGIL 
10 The Navigator Company S.A. NAVIGATOR 
11 NOS, SGPS, S.A. NOS 
12 Novabase, SGPS, S.A. NOVABASE 
13 Pharol, SGPS, S.A. PHAROL 
14 REN – Redes Energéticas Nacionais, S.G.P.S., S.A. REN 
15 Semapa - Sociedade de Investimento e Gestão, SGPS, SA SEMAPA 
16 Sonae Capital, SGPS, S.A. SONAE CAPITAL 
17 Sonae - SGPS, S.A SONAE, SGPS 
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Appendix C – Cross-sectional Descriptive Statistics  
Table 17: Standard Deviation and Skewness– Cross-sectional Variables 
 Standard Deviation Skewness 
Group Compensation (€) 918912,36 2,63 
Ind. Compensation (€) 521910,18 1,46 
ROA (%) 0,50 -5,99 
Sales (€) 2828229623,53 5,02 
Tenure (Years) 10,41 1,96 
Blockholder (%) 0,23 -0,01 
Independent Board Ratio 0,24 0,69 
Consultants (nº) 0,85 0,29 
Independent Consultants Ratio 0,46 -0,45 
TSR (%) 3,91 5,95 
  
 
 
Table 18: Correlation Matrix – Cross-sectional Variables 
 Comp. ROA Sales Tenure Own. BHold. IBR Conslt. ICR Dual DInd DServ DTT 
Comp. 1,000             
ROA 0,104 1,000            
Sales 0,379 0,067 1,000           
Tenure 0,141 0,140 0,180 1,000          
Own. -0,036 0,110 0,247 -0,024 1,000         
BHold. 0,101 0,284 0,048 0,021 0,371 1,000        
IBR 0,155 -0,316 0,296 -0,192 0,027 -0,001 1,000       
Conslt. 0,308 0,017 -0,001 -0,396 -0,203 -0,047 0,190 1,000      
ICR 0,150 -0,144 -0,128 -0,359 -0,286 -0,175 0,089 0,078 1,000     
Dual 0,028 -0,100 0,147 0,460 0,026 -0,243 -0,006 -0,138 -0,228 1,000    
DInd -0,160 0,018 -0,061 0,612 -0,119 -0,100 -0,146 -0,589 -0,240 0,109 1,000   
DServ -0,133 0,032 -0,085 -0,173 0,196 0,027 -0,048 0,000 -0,182 -0,006 -0,019 1,000  
DTT 0,309 0,063 -0,089 -0,200 -0,256 -0,150 0,130 0,519 0,100 -0,131 -0,082 -0,103 1,000 
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Appendix D – Panel Descriptive Statistics  
Table 19: 2017 Standard Deviation and Skewness – Panel Variables 
2017 Standard Deviation Skewness 
Group Compensation (€) 1069928,20 2,40 
Ind. Compensation (€) 545840,03 1,06 
ROA (%) 0,74 -4,11 
Sales (€) 1462612298,68 2,95 
Tenure (Years) 7,00 1,43 
Blockholder (%) 0,22 0,04 
Independent Board Ratio 0,26 0,74 
Consultants (nº) 0,92 2,06 
Independent Consultants Ratio 0,45 -0,73 
 
Table 20: 2014 Standard Deviation and Skewness – Panel Variables 
2014 Standard Deviation Skewness 
Group Compensation (€) 619444,72 1,15 
Ind. Compensation (€) 467204,43 0,75 
ROA (%) 0,07 -3,36 
Sales (€) 1283908323,73 2,65 
Tenure (Years) 6,69 1,41 
Blockholder (%) 0,21 -0,15 
Independent Board Ratio 0,20 0,33 
Consultants (nº) 0,66 -0,06 
Independent Consultants Ratio 0,43 -0,94 
 
Table 21: 2011 Standard Deviation and Skewness – Panel Variables 
2011 Standard Deviation Skewness 
Group Compensation (€) 431484,82 -0,17 
Ind. Compensation (€) 447311,63 0,17 
ROA (%) 0,02 0,48 
Sales (€) 1879537296,42 2,06 
Tenure (Years) 5,23 1,51 
Blockholder (%) 0,30 0,26 
Independent Board Ratio 0,18 0,28 
Consultants (nº) 0,53 3,14 
Independent Consultants Ratio 0,43 -0,47 
 
  
 
Table 22: 2017 Maximum and Minimum values – Panel Variables 
2017 Maximum Minimum 
Group Compensation (€) 4746579,36 294000,00 
Ind. Compensation (€) 2288274,00 294000,00 
ROA (%) 0,09 -3,00 
Sales (€) 5710151936,00 701609,00 
Tenure (Years) 27,00 3,00 
Blockholder (%) 0,83 0,10 
Independent Board Ratio 0,78 0,00 
Consultants (nº) 6,00 2,00 
Independent Consultants 
Ratio 1,00 0,00 
 
Table 23: 2014 Maximum and Minimum values – Panel Variables 
2014 Maximum Minimum 
Group Compensation (€) 2461875,02 149688,00 
Ind. Compensation (€) 1719000,00 149688,00 
ROA (%) 0,07 -0,24 
Sales (€) 4974126500,00 560340,00 
Tenure (Years) 24,00 1,00 
Blockholder (%) 0,78 0,13 
Independent Board Ratio 0,56 0,00 
Consultants (nº) 4,00 2,00 
Independent Consultants Ratio 1,00 0,00 
 
Table 24: 2011 Maximum and Minimum values – Panel Variables 
2011 Maximum Minimum 
Group Compensation (€) 1425895,00 154053,90 
Ind. Compensation (€) 1386888,43 154053,90 
ROA (%) 0,07 -0,01 
Sales (€) 6000742302,00 494842,00 
Tenure (Years) 21,00 1,00 
Blockholder (%) 1,00 0,08 
Independent Board Ratio 0,50 0,00 
Consultants (nº) 5,00 3,00 
Independent Consultants Ratio 1,00 0,00 
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Table 25: Correlation Matrix – Panel Variables 
 Comp. ROA Sales Tenure Own. BHold. IBR Conslt. ICR Dual DInd DServ DTT 
Comp. 1,000             
ROA 0,133 1,000            
Sales 0,334 0,092 1,000           
Tenure 0,602 0,132 0,185 1,000          
Own. -0,193 0,107 0,171 0,095 1,000         
BHold. 0,060 0,227 0,077 0,049 0,340 1,000        
IBR 0,076 -0,309 0,363 -0,257 -0,001 0,026 1,000       
Conslt. 0,155 0,015 -0,173 -0,026 -0,359 -0,058 0,104 1,000      
ICR 0,264 -0,124 0,177 0,103 -0,319 -0,143 0,323 0,127 1,000     
Dual 0,112 -0,128 -0,127 0,503 -0,179 -0,258 -0,187 0,023 0,089 1,000    
DInd 0,172 0,117 0,052 0,492 -0,119 0,180 -0,403 -0,139 -0,120 0,267 1,000   
DServ -0,206 0,094 0,168 -0,102 0,485 0,240 0,211 -0,068 -0,056 -0,179 -0,410 1,000  
DTT -0,079 -0,334 0,030 -0,162 -0,019 -0,383 0,055 -0,189 0,140 0,042 -0,257 -0,342 1,000 
 
